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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
Political parties play a prominent part in the
functioning of democratic societies, for they act as
one of the chief sources for the aggregation of the
people's interests, organize elections, run candidates,
provide for a peaceful transfer of political power and
help to organize the formal government.

Consequently,

the importance of studying political parties is noted
by many authorities.

Avery Leiserson, for example, a

generally recognized authority on political parties,
states that parties provide a major link between the
people and government, between separate formal agencies
and government officials, and between official and non
official holders of power.

He shows that parties cut

across the study of the conventional processes of government: the administrative, electoral, legislative,
executive, and, at times, the judicial.^

He concludes

Avery Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the
Study of Politics," American Political Science Review.
LI, No, 4 (December, 1957), 948-949.

-1-

-2that in order to acquire an understanding of democracy and its
problems, one must first study political parties both in
theory and action, for they are the criteria of democracy's
popular sovereignty, majority rule, group consultation and
minority rights.
Dther authorities have also stressed the importance
of political parties in the political life of societies.
Sigmund Neumann, for example, states that:
It is through the nexus of political parties that
the manifold character and dynamic life of the
different continents can be constantly r e v e a l e d . ^
Political parties, he argues, must be seen in the
settings of their own governmental systems, historical
circumstances, national characteristics and institutional
t radit i o n s . ^

Consequently, parties in their organization,

function and outlook vary from country to country.
addition, the party system evolves in
various countries.

In

different forms in

Since political parties enjoy key

po

sitions in political systems, their evolution has attracted
the attention of a number of political scientists.
In addition to Sigmund Neumann’s book, Modern
Political Parties. the study of parties has been accelerated
^Ibid.
2
Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties: Approaches
to Comparative Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1956), p. 2.
3Ibid.. p. 4.

-3with the apperance of Political Parties by Maurice. Duverger.
Although these works are limited in the scope of their study
and are viewed with dissidence by critical political
tists and the authors themselves, they nonetheless

scien
represent

remarkable progress on this particular subject.^
Some general comments about the nature of various
party systems are necessary before attention is directed
to the Mexican scene.

These brief comments concern the

nature of two party systems, multi-party systems, and
democratic one-party systems.
The Mature of Two Party Systems
Maurice Duverger, in discussing the origin of two party
systems, suggests that political dualism is found in different
sociological conceptions.

He mentions that the revolutionary

temperament can be contrasted with the conservative temper
ament.

Even countries which appear to have many divisions

often reveal basic dual tendencies.^

For example, he notes

that Francoise Goguel had been able to demonstrate the dual
conflict between order and movement was the underlying factor
of the Third French Republic^.

The two-party system seems-;to *

■^Frederick C. Englemapn, "A Critique of Recent
Writings on Political Parties," Comparative Politics:
A R eader, ed. Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter
"[London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 378-385.
2
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their
Organization And Activity In The Modern State, trans.
Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1955), pp. 215-216.

_4correspond to the nature of things, for there is generally
a choice between alternatives,

lost of the major conflicts

of history were of a dual nature.
Throughout history all the great factional
conflicts have been dualist: Armagnacs and
Burgundians, Guelphs and Ghibellines, Catholics
and Protestants, Girondins and Jacobins, Conservatives
and Liberals, Bourgeois and Socialists, ’Western’
and Communist ...•*■
Duverger argues that "the natural movement of societies
tends towards the two-party s y s t e m . But if dualism is
natural, why has it not flourished except in Anglo-Saxon
countries and their imitators?

Duverger answers this question

by^suggesting that historical explanations can account for it,
and if one wishes to determine the real origins of dual sys
tems, he should investigate the circumstance in each country
which determine the party system for the influences of na
tional factors are considerable.

However, one should not

disregard major technical factors, such as the electoral sys
tems.

His conclusion is that the simple-majority, single

ballot system tends to favor the two party system.
An almost complete correlation is observable
between the simple-majority single-ballot system
and the two-party system: dualist countries use
the simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote
countries are dualist.
^Ibid., p. 216.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.. p. 217.

-5E.E. Schattschneider concurs that the electoral system
is a factor which directly influences the two-party system
and states that since political parties center around elec-'
tions , it would be strange indeed; i f ;the’ parties were not
influenced by the nature of these elections.-^
V.O. Key also regards the institutional factor of elec
tions as being one of the factors shaping the duality of
American politics.

He notes that the single-member district

and plurality elections can encourage dual division.

Key

also stipulates, as does Neumann, that the winner-take-all
election of the president exerts a centripetal influence
upon the organization of the party and encourages dualism.
Key

o

stresses, however, that no one specific factor can be

attributed to the causation of party dualism.
The safest explanation is that several factors
conspired toward the development of the American
dual party pattern. These included the accidents
of history that produced dual divisions on great
issues at critical points in our history, the
consequences of our institutional forms, the
clustering of popular opinions around a point of
central consensus rather than their bipolarization,
and perhaps others.
E.E. Schattschneider, Political Parties And Democracy
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 27.
^V.O. Key, Politics. Parties & Pressure Groups
(5th ed. rev, ; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964),
pp. 208-209.
3 Ibid.. p. 210.

-6\
Neumann also stresses that historical developments
can be conducive of two-party development.

These precedents

he lists as follows: social homogeneity, political continuity,
an early sanction of responsible political parties striving
for political control, and political parties oriented toward
one elective office, such as the presidency of the United
States, or the premiership of Britain.-^
The Nature and Evolution o f t h e Multi-Party System
Duverger, as stated before, subscribes to the theory
that the two-party system is natural.

When this system is

subject to modification by a party split or overlapping
i n t e r e s t s h e suggests a multi-party system can develop.
Internal divisions result in a split when factions become
exasperated and can no longer find a common base; this
type of split often causes center parties to rise.

Over

lapping of interests, on the other:: hand, is caused by a
number of different dualisms of opinion which, when combined,
result in multi-partite division.

The mutual independence

of sets of antitheses is a factor which causes the multipartism to rise.

Duverger shows, for example, that a series

of antitheses in politics, sociology, economics, race and
religion can give rise to a multi-partite split.^
"''Neumann, op. cit. , p. 402.
2

Duverger, o£. cit., pp. 229-233.

-7Gwendolen H. Carter and John H. Herz believe that what
determines the development of a two-party or multi-party sys
tem is the degree of unity within a community.
state

They also

that '’multiparty systems obviously reflect divisions

within the community, divisions in social structure, economic
1
interest, racial composition or ideological preference."
Sigmund Neumann accounts for the rise of the multi
party systems by a historical interpretation.
Wherever fundamental cleavages in social
structure evolve and continue to exist because of
differences in nationalities, regions, religion, or
class which are often fostered by outside influences
like irrendenta movements and revolutionary
inter
nationals; wherever political revolutions coincide
with great social transformations, as in France,
central and eastern Europe, and the Near and Far
East; wherever a controlling elite, through the
divide-and-rule device, prevents parties from ful
filling their genuinely political functions of
presenting clear-cut policy alternatives, as in
Bismarck’s strategies, for example; wherever the
political machinery of a state diffuses the elec
torate’s division by numerous choices— wherever
any or all of these complicating factors enter the
national political scene, a multiparty system finds
its raison de*&tre.2
Neumann maintains that often multiparty systems tend
to be centrifugal.

He attributes this to their inability

to gain majorities in elections which in turn

causes

Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz,
Government And Politics: In The Twentieth Century
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 110.
2
Neumann, op. cit., p. 402.
3 Ibid.

-8multi-party systems to concentrate on the peripheral forces
of special interest groups.1
J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham support Neumann’s
theory and point out that in the French multi-party system
many of the French political parties resemble interest groups.
The French multi-party organization provided direct
representation in the legislature to the various
interests through the elective process. ?ery often,
the leaders of the French interest groups were them
selves elected to public office as leaders of the
political parties and thus directly represented a
particular interest for which these parties might
stand--or, indeed, of which they were often frankly
composed, e.g. the aforementioned Pouiadist party,
whose sole aim was to perpetuate non-payment of taxes,
or at least to make the tax-collector’s life miserable.2
The Nature and Evolution of the Single Party Systems
The third and final form of party system to be discussed
is the single party system.

Although the idea of a single

party system has often been equated with the idea of a total
itarian or dictatorial party, the proliferation of single
parties in democratic states leads many observers such as
Duverger, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, Gwendolen Carter and
John Herz to the conclusion that non-authoritarian, one-party
democracies can exist.
1Ibid.

2J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham, Elements of
Democratic Government (4th ed. rev.; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 354.

-9Examples of one-party democracies can be seen in the
Congress Party of India, the Republican People’s Party in
Turkey, and the Party of Revolutionary Institutions in Mexico.
Also democratic single-party systems exist in some African
states.
Ruth Sehachter, in her discussion of mass parties in
West Africa, notes that these single-party systems created
by African leaders spring from the egalitarian and liberating
forces which we associate with democracy.

She suggests that

some of these mass parties encourage factors which can make
possible the working of the machinery of democratic systems.-*•
Robert Michel holds that there is a constant oligarchical
tendency in social organizations.

He remarks that this theory

is applicable to political parties, for he believes that
parties in their organization and operation are controlled by
an elite group which rules without much limitation.

If this

is true in political parties as he claims', there would be
little room for democracy within a one party system, for a
single party,controlled by an elite group, would not offer
the opportunity for democracy within its ranks.
were to exist, there would have to be competition

If democracy
between:

parties.
^Ruth Sehachter, "Single-Party Systems in West
Africa," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 2
(June, 1961), pp. 304-307.
^Francis W, Coker, Recent Political Thought (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962), p. 329.

-10E.E. Schattschneider holds that all democratic systems
are competitive and that democracy

does not exist unless

there are two or more parties which can nominate candidates
and present alternative programs.'*'
however, by Duverger, that

The argument is countered,

this needed choice of alternatives

is often found within the ranks of the single party, and that
although pluralism may be prohibited or limited outside the
single-party , p luralism can, with the form a,ti0„Q_o.f__£a.c_ti©nsu,
be reborn within the party.^
Gwendolen Carter and John Herz concur as to the pos
sibility of intra-party democratic opposition:
The possibilities of criticism within the oneparty democracy provide in themselves a type of op
position which should not be underestimated. The mass
parties in the newly developing countries are far
from monolithic.
It is far more difficult to identify
and classify the kind of opposition1which operates,
for example, within Felix Houphouet-Boigny’s RDA
(Rassemblernent D^raocratique Africain), which holds all
the seats in the Ivory Coast, than it would be if the
opposition were organized as a separate party--but its
existence has been abundantly evidenced by changing
policies-» In other words, something very close to the
interplay of government and opposition in mature de
mocracies may take place within the one party of the
new states, but only, of course, if opportunities for
criticism are not stifled.3
"^Schattschneider, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
2Duverger, op. cit., pp. 278-279.

3Garter and Herz, pp. cit♦, p. 118.

-11Again they note, "To have only one party . . .
a dogma but an expedient.

is not

The objective is to mobilize

the people voluntarily to work for the vastly important
objective of national development."^-

Rupert Emerson sug

gests, "The single party is an instrument to achieve the
national solidarity which is otherwise conspicuous by its
absence, and often it is the principal instrument available
for that purpose.

Although practice does not always confirm the argument,
in principle it can be argued that the single-party can
enlist the qualified leaders and populace of a country for
a unified attack upon national problems, and thus they can
avoid the dispersion of effort and the factionalism that
often results when powerful opposition parties are in
e xistence. ^

Although minor opposition parties are legally

allowed, their existence does not challenge the monopoly of
the dominant one-party systems.
Often the single party becomes identified with the
government.

All government organs, executive, administrative,

legislative and judicial, link their objectives with those of
the party.

It is noted that party members permeate the

^ I b i d ., p. 1 1 7 .
..-Rupea?teEmer&6BQ- 'P o litical M o d e r n i z a t i o n s IffeerSingle P a r t y aS v s t e m
6f ;denver, P u b l i c a t i o n :

The Social Science Foundation and Department of Inter
national Relations, No. 1, 1963-64), p. 25.
3M d . , P* 24.

-12machinery '.of:,government..
The representatives of the party, therefore, have
seats everywhere, from the Councils of Ministers
to the smallest local or special committees; from
the Civil Service to the Trade Unions, Co-operatives,
Cultural Associations, etc; unless the party assumes
directly certain functions, for itself or for its
ancillary organizations.
Although single-party systems are generally cen
tralized, they keep in contact with the mass through
pyramidal, hierarchical structures.

Within this structure,

contact "is established not only upwards, in the direction
’people-leaders’, but also downwards, in the direction
’leaders-people’.
It has been noted that in emerging countries, single
parties, symbolizing a nationalist movement and a struggle
for independence, evolve and remain the dominant party.
Gabriel A. Almond has classified such movements as domi
nant non-authoritarian parties and notes:
Most of the significant interest groups, associa
tions! and non-associational, have joined in the
nationalist movement around a common program of
national independence.
In the period following
emancipation the nationalist party continues as
the greatly dominant party, opposed in elections
by relatively small left-Wing or traditionalist
and particularist movements.
This type of party
system is a formally free one, but the possibility
of a coherent loyal opposition is lacking.^
Duverger, op. cit.. p. 258.
^Ibid.
3
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed)
The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, I960), p. 41.

-13These parties , evolving in a society which is

^

changing, are subject to the influences of modernization
such as urbanization and industrialization*

V.O. Key

regards certain aspects of modernization as factors which
will eventually lead to its termination.-

He remarks that

the consequences of the change from a rural to an urban
society and the development of industry and trade in a
heretofore agrarian type of society pose a threat to the
continuance of the one-party political systems within the
South.

Key particularly notes the potential force of

urbanization and labor and states, "As obstructions to
urban political activity are overcome, a significant expan
sion of labor influence may be expected.**^
Robert J, Alexander notes, as does Key, the process
of modernization.

Alexander, in dealing with Latin American

parties also sees them as a reflection of the basic economic
changes but does not predict their downfall.

Alexander

remarks that the changes in industrialization, urbanization,
and population are creating a new society which is besieged
by new interest groups, organized urban workers, new industrialists, and even peasantry.

These elements are all

Vo.

Key, Southern Politics: In State And Nation
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 673.
^Robert J. Alexander, "The Emergence of Modern
Political Parties in Latin America,*' Politics of Change
In Latin America ed. Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead
"(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 101-102.

^

trying to seek their objectives through political activity.
The political parties, mirroring these changes, are becoming
instruments to assist these new interests in their struggle.
This process of modernization is taking place in Mexico
as it has in other Latin American countries.

Here the Party

of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI), the dominant non-author
itarian party of Mexico, has controlled Mexican politics since
its origin in 1929.

Will this party, affected by moderniza

tion, evolve, as Key predicts for the one-party system of the
South, into another type of party system or, on the other
hand, will it follow Alexander’s view and continue to persist
as the dominant party?

These questions will be explored

throughout the thesis, but before an examination of the
stability and instability of the PRI is presented, one must
first become familiar with its evolution in Mexican society.
1Ibid.

CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM
On September 1, 1928, in his State of Union Address,

I

Plutarco Calles told the Mexican people that they should
pass "from the historical condition of a ’country of a
nan1 to the ’nation of institutions and laws.’"I

And

in March of 1929, the instrument which was to change
Mexico into a nation of institutions and laws, the
National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario.
or PNR) assembled in convention,'

Prior to the formation of

the PNR, Mexico had undergone rule by dictatorship followed
by a period of experimentation with multiple political
parties.
After independence was achieved in 1822, Mexico
experienced a period in which political parties were

1^

virtually non-existent, for rule by dictators Was the
accepted order.
-

However, two elements, which could not

,

^

^

^

^

Frank R. Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in
One Party Democracy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1956), p. 50.,
citing Camara de Diputados, Ano I, Vol. I, September,1928.

-15-

—

-16be termed political parties in the current sense of the
word, existed.

These movements were the Centralist, a

conservative organization representing professionals,
military and large landowners, and the Federalist, a liberal
group representing the merchants, and the anticlerical and
1
middle-class elements.'1

/
In 1908, President Porfirio Diaz

opened the gate to the formation of parties, and factions
within the conservative and liberal camps split into six
parties: the Scientists, the Anti-Re-electionist Party,
<

the Democratic Party, the Democratic Nationalist^arty, !
the Pure Liberal Party, and the Re-electionist Party.2
These parties supported candidates for the presiderttial
election of 1909.

But when it was seen that a peaceful

transfer of power could not foe realized, a revolutionary
movement begun by the intellectuals and supported by the
middle class rose against the Diaz regime.

This Revolution

of 1910, the Mexicans feel, is a continuing revolution and
will not be completed until its goals have been ‘achieved.
The chaos of the years immediately following the revolution
left Mexico with little

organized political activity.

■^William Tucker, The Mexican Government Today
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p . 41.

2

Brandenburg, oj>. cit., pp. 2-9.

-17Military factions which surrounded the revolutionary caudillos
(bosses) were the main source of political action and effec
tiveness.
From 1917 to 1929, an experimental period of multiple
political parties occurred.

The Constitutional Liberal Party,

the National Cooperative Party, the Mexican Labor Party, the
National Agrarian Party, the Revolutionary Confederation, the
Mexican Communist Party and many state political parties
existed in this period.
Although the National Cooperative Party, the Mexican
Labor Party, and the National Agrarian Party, emerged at
times as influential parties, the period between 1917 and
1929 was one of instability in which parties vacillated in
response to personal leaders and ambitions. During this
£
time, Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles were in control.
Obregdh held the presidency from 1920 to 1924 and was suc
ceeded in 1924 by Calles.

In 1927, the Mexican Constitution

was amended to allow a former president to be re-elected but
stipulated that a president could not succeed himself.^
^Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government In Transition
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 118.
o
Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico
(2d ed. rev.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963),
pp. 194-195.

^

-18Consequently, Obregc^n again ran successfully for the presi
dency, but was assasinated before taking office.

During the

reign of these caudillos. the political system was besieged
with problems from within and from without.

Within the

revolutionary family, bitterly expressed opinions arose as
to what direction the Revolution should take.

Because of

the vagueness and all-inclusiveness of the ideology of

the ^

Revolution, there was no definite consensus as to what
objectives to seek.

Outside the party, the anti-revolu

tionary factions, the Church, the Porfirian industrialists,
V

the large landholders, the political machines of the South
and the West, and the foreign interest posed a threat.Jg
Upon the assassination of president-elect Obregon in 1928,
the political leaders at the national and state levels
struggled for power and soon erstwhile revolutionaries
were going against the government as were counter-revolu
tionary forces.^

To meet the crisis, President Calles 'called
i' a

for the initiation of an all embracing revolutionary party.
(Calles) bound the regional and state political machines
into a separate, formal, political organization.
In
turn its heads controlled the constitutionally prescribed
organs of government— Executive, Judiciary,
Legislature.^

1Ibid.
2
Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 53.
^Cline, op. cit., p. 198.

-19The state political machines relinquished their local
name and formed under the political machine of the revolu
tionary party,

the PNR.

The states agreed to

support a

national slate

of candidates which would be selected by the

PN R ’s executive committee, Comite E.jecutivo Nacional (CEN).

I

In return, they were given a share in national policy making
and patronage.

The national bureaucracy, the

cabinet, and the legislature
members.

consisted solely

president’s
of party

The judicial branch, appointed by the legislature,

was !also a cog of the party.
This formation period of the party, which lasted until
1935, was called Personalism©.

During this time Calles

strove to maintain his own personal power by limiting the
authority of the president of Mexico:■ and by controlling
the nation through the president of the PNR’s Central
Executive Committee.

From 1930 until 1935, a hegemony of

the CEN existed over the executive, and legislative branches
of government and Calles dictated the manner in which the
government should be operated through the CEN.

The CEN

carried out his orders to the extreme that it often over
ruled the presidents of Mexico.2
Calles tried to stabilize the CEN’s power by an at
tempt to initiate a six year plan for Mexican governmental
1Ibid.. p. 199.

2

Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 63-66.

\

-20progress.

The CEN was to act as a reviewing board for this

plan of government.

The plan, placing as it would party and

governmental power upon the president of the PNR, reduced
Mexico’s president to a figurehead.^
The Six Year Plan of Calles^was thwarted by the election
of L^zaro Clrdenas to the Mexican presidency in 1934.
Cardenas, being a liberal and opposed to the conservative
Calle’s program, sought to initiate his own plan.

Cardenas

received assurances from labor and agrarian leaders of their
support, took care that all influential military personnel
o
were on his side, and broke with Calles.
Thus, on June 1, 1
1935 the first phase of the PNR’s history came to an end.
The second phase of the party, the period of
Collectivism, began in 1935 and lasted until 1943.

clrdenas

sought to integrate the labor forces into the PNR and to
unify the agrarian forces.

In 1935, c/xdenas adopted an

"open-door policy" to be followed with regard to the agrarian
organizations.and labor.. Membership in an established union
or in an e.jido. center of the communal land systems, pre
supposed the individual qualifications for party membership.^
In 1937 the Party of the Mexican Revolution took on a
new organization, corporate structure and a new name, the
I

~

Ibid., p. 69.
^Ibid., p. 76.
3
Ibid.. p. 81.

'

' ~

'

"

-21Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM).

The PRM’s structure

was divided into four sectors, agriculture, labor, popular,
and military.

The basis of these was the local organization

such as the labor union.

j

These local organizations were

grouped into statewide federations and the state federation
represented the sectors in a nationwide sector organization.
Cardenas, by uniting the most active interest groupings
under the auspices of the party where they could be controlled
by national-level sector organizations, centralized political
control in the capital.

A pyramidal structure was established

with control emanating from the top rather than from the
grass roots.

This corporative nature obliterated the local
o
political machines of the caudillos.
It was during this period that the PRM became the
'official party,* for it became identified with the state,.

^

The president of the party’s National Executive
Committee met with the president’s cabinet as a
matter of course, and quite frequently the party
actually initiated official actions. Starting’
with Cdrdenas' administration, for example, SixYear Plans for economic and social development
were prepared by the PRM, 'with the government
collaborating,’ as one of the plans describes
the process.
Cardenas ended the duarchy of the party and government
being run separately, and from this time they have become
^Scott,

ojd.

cit. ,

pp.

^Ibid., pp. 134-135.
^Ibid., p. 136.

131-132.

I

>
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almost synonymous.

There has been a broader inclusion of the

people in the party’s ranks, and the actual government has
been representing more and more people.^
“Institutionalism," phase three of the party’s
development, began in March of 1943 when the Mational
Federation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) united with the
CMC and the labor unions to select party candidates for
federal, state, and municipal offices.^
President Avila Camacho, Cardenas’ successor, demili
tarized the party by abandoning the military sector and made
changes in the party’s operation by adding more represen
tation from the lower middle classes.

Membership within the

party was put on a direct and individual basis; thus, the
individual could enroll and escape the power of the bosses.^
Public dissatisfaction, owing to the fact that the P R M ’s
functional organizations could not successfully incorporate
the ever-increasing Mexican interests outside the member' as
sociations, led to a change in the name and structure of the
party.

In 1946 the PRM became the PRI, the Partido

Revolucionario Institucional. as it is still known.

The

corporate structure and political power of the sectors were
temporarily terminated.

Across the board primaries ended

^Cline, op. cit., p. 324.
“^Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 101.
3
Cline, o£. cit., p. 325.

-23the sector designation of candidates and presidential nomi
nations were no longer to be sector controlled but based on
the selection of ten delegates in each election district*^
However, an internal party conflict arose, for the PRI sectors
did not wish to relinquish their previous status, and it
seemed that there was not enough loyalty to general prin
ciples to enable the party to function in a "give-and-take
atmosphere of primary elections.

Consequently, at a

meeting in Cuernavaca in 1950, the reversion to the sector
organization was undertaken.

But the conditions which had

originally required a change from the sector organizational
structure could not be disregarded.
attempt to integrate

Thus, the party made an

and satisfy these expanding interests

by broadening and expanding the alternative means of access
to the decision making process.

More interest associations

were brought into the PRI, especially through the Popular
Sector, and attempts were made to implement governmental
recognition of those interests which remained outside the
official party structure.
Equally important, the consultative process whereby
important factors in Mexico's society and economy
which are not part of the sector organizations can
participate in political decisions affecting their, .
status has been institutionalized to a very great
extent.
■'"Scott, op. Git.. pp. 140-141.
2Ibid., p. 142.
^Ibid., pp. 142-143.
4 Ibid.

|

-24The preceding pages have traced the evolution of
Mexico’s single party system from its period of personal
control, through its stage of collectivism and finally to
its current stage of an institutionalized party.
this party evolve in the future?

How will

Will its dominance persist

or will the one-party system be successfully challenged?
What factors contribute to the stability and instability
of this one-party dominance?

These are the questions which

will be explored in the ensuing chapters.

CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRI
The PRI functions through a highly centralized
hierarchical structure which extends from the national
level, through the state level, to the local municipal
level.

Through its organization of committees and its

three sectors, the farm, labor, and popular, the PRI
presents an institutionalized party system which is able
to reach out and envelop all strata of Mexican society.
I

It is through this Complex party machine that the PRI
seeks to balance the interests of Mexico’s pluralistic
society.
At the national level, the party is organized
through the National Assembly, the Gran Comisi^n and
the Central Executive Committee (CEC).
The National Assembly, nominally the supreme organ
of the party, meets every three years.

This assembly

examines the activities of the other party national
organs, reviews national politics in the light of the
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-26party’s program and ©lects the Central Executive Committee.
The National Assembly’s membership of about 1,000 is evenly
divided among the three sectors.

The meetings of the

National Assembly are controlled by sector and party leader
ship .
The Gran Comisicfn is the agency in which the supreme
power of the PRI is vested between the sessions of the
Assembly.

The Gran Comisi<fet8s

membership of thirty is

equally divided among the sectors.

It meets at the call of

the Central Executive Coum’ittee, checks the annual report of
the CEC, and reviews any sanctions which the Central Executive
Committee may have imposed against party members.

2

Despite the statutory prominence of the National
Assembly, the most important organ of the PRI is the Central
Executive ColWBittee, for it is this committee which

repre

sents the PRI throughout the entire country.
Of the three, the Central Committee and its pres
ident are, by far the most influential, partly because
the party’s"’ statutes give the® a high degree of
strategic'control over other party organs, partly
because the Committee's membership represents functional
interest associations which are the principal sources of
political power, and paitly because it is through this
agency that the President of the Republic wields his
concentrated authority.3
-

*

■

1Ibid.. p. 155.
^Ibid., p. 156.

3Ibid.. p. 155.
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The Central Committee’s membership is comprised of
representatives from the three sectors.

There are seven

members on the Central Committee: the President, the
Secrfetary-General, the Secretary of Agrarian Activities,
the Secretary of Labor Activities, and two secretaries,
one from the Senate and the other from the Chamber of
Deputies for political Activities.

The Central Committee

is able to reach and influence many factions to a great
extent, for it controls the other functional organs of
the party: it can reach out to the sectors; it directs the
state and local committees; it advises the National Assembly
on decisions; and it controls the nomination of officers.

l

The president of Mexico and the CEC approve internal nomi
nating procedures for the PRI’s candidates.2

Who is to run

for what office is decided within the ranks of the PRI, and
is announced to the populace.

Nominating conventions of the

PRI_are nothing more th_a.P_r-U.bber stamp approv a l o f the PRI
selected candidates.

The CEC is not completely a one-way

organ, for it listens to the interest of the people

ex

pressed by representatives of the sectors, and they influence
its decision making and selection of nominees.
Ibid., pp. 156-157.
o

Ibid., p. 161.

The CEC has

-28tried to aggregate and articulate the interest of the sectors
and other factions, and has sought to further understanding
among the president::I'M;,his cabinet,national committees of
labor, professional, commercial, industrial and small property
groups. -*•
The CEC's offices in Mexico City and at regional levels
are crowded daily with political groups, functional groups,
and ad hoc groups which exchange information, ideas and argue
about how to seek their objective’s,2
Often the CEC acts as an intermediary between the gov
ernment and the people.

An example of this is shown in the

Arroyo de Lanzarote dam case.

When small property owners,

being deprived of what they considered their just share of
the waters of the Arroyo de Lanzarote and suffering severe
crop damages as the consequence, failed to receive a response
to their request that the government make a decision as to
the allocation of the waters, the CEC’s Secretary of Agrarian
Activities took the problem to the federal agency of Water
Resources and gained an administrative ruling that provided
for an equitable distribution of the water
"^Vincent L. Padgett, "Mexico’s One-Party System:
A Re-evaluation." American Political Science Review, XLI
(December, 1957), 1000.
2Ibid„,

3Ibid.
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The control of party activities from the national to the
municipal level is controlled by the CEC.

As Scott maintains,

"In short, it is the apex of the hierarchical pyramid organ
ization that controls the entire party.
In addition to judging the intra-party electoral proce
dures, the CEG also seeks to solve intra-party conflicts.
Each of the GEC secretaries of labor, farm, and popular,
being members of the sectors which correspond with their
party office, are continually pressing the needs of their
corresponding sectors and seeking to solve their problems.
The two political secretaries find that it is their duty to
discuss given projects of the executive branch with congres
sional members, officers of the party, governors, and leaders
of the sectors.
The secretaries ;of political action have functioned
through personal conversations to keep the views of
the organized power groupings, groups of the execu
tive branch, and congressional leaders from becoming
so divergent as to create misunderstanding and ill
will on any issue of political importance'— whether
it might be a legislative proposal or the result of
«
some contested intra-party or constitutional elections.
Although Congress always seems united on all legislative
measures, it is the job of the party political secretaries
................. ...
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1Scotty. op. eft. , p'. 157.
2
■ .......
cLeon:V^,Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican
One Party System" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern, 1955;, p. 142.
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-30to "secure a unanimity in fact which will constitute a real
basis for the formal unanimity characterizing legislative
approval of the measure."-^

It is their duty to convince the

various interests of the worthiness of the measure, and, if
failing in this, to try to seek a compromise between the
executive goals and those of the affected groups.*^
Below the national level are the Regional Committees,
These committees function in the twenty-nine states of
Mexico, its two territories, and the Federal District.
Regional Committee has six members.

Each

Its structure is the

same as the CEC, with the exception that is has one secretary
for Political Activities, not two.^
These Regional Committees have helped to link the gov
ernment and the people together.

They have provided alter

nate channels of communication when personality conflicts or
minority interests have frustrated attempts to deal with the
government through the regular interest groups and committees.
The interpretation of popular selection with regard to the
choice of candidates for municipal offices Is another impor
tant function of the Regional Committees.^
^Ibid., p. 141.
2Ibid.
2Ibid.. p. 159.
^Padgett, op. cit., p. 1002.

The Regional

-31Committees solve differences among the sectors, and between
individuals in the party; they create local centers for
political study; and, with the approval of the CEC, they call
state-level nominating c o n v e n t i o n s T h e president of these
committees has the same power as does the president of the
CEC, only his is confined to the state level.
The Municipal Committee or District Committee, confined
to the Federal District only, are the committees at the
local level of government.

There are five municipal commit

teemen, supposedly representative of the economic and social
areas of which they serve, and these five elect a president
and a secretary-general from among their own membership.
These committees help to carry out the PRI's program at a
local level and are responsible for keeping a list of party
membership.2
With fegard to party membership , the PRI views it
self as a ”1national association’ of the progressive com
ponents of the Mexican population.1,2
- ■-

1-

■-

--

-■

■'‘Scott, op. cit., p. 160.
2Ibid., p. 162.
3

Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 130.

Qualification for its
—

—-

-32members are presented in a statutory provision:
Mexican citizens in full exercise of their political
rights who apply for and obtain affiliation with the
Party, respect its declaration of principles, publicly
avow to comply with its statutes, programs, and reso1
lutions, and who, besides observing good conduct, may
not be minister of any cult, belong to any religious
corporation or association whose principles, programs,
or campaign tactics are in opposition to those of the
Party, or to any other group organized for political
purposes.
The PRI seeks to include the major organized interests
of the country within its membership (with the exception of
large business).

These interests are organized into the

three party sectors, farm, labor, and popular.^
These sector organizations are the heart of the PRI*s
power.

Sector members fill party positions at the state

and national levels and are seated on the CEC.

The sectors

pay most of the bills, acquire the votes, and turn out people
for PRI rallies.^

PRI nominations to elective posts, usually

synonymous with election, are given to the sector which is
strongest in the district to be represented.
of strength is accorded by numbers.

The standard

Consequently, this

factor has caused the sector organizations to conduct their
•^Ibid., p. 131.
L. - .

i
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Martin: C. Needier, '’The Political Development of
Mexico," American Political Science Review LV, No. 2
(June, 1961), 309.
3
Philip R. Taylor, "The Mexican Elections of 1958:
Affirmation of Authoritarianism," Western Political Quarterly,
XII, No. 3 (Spring, 1960), 735.

own recruiting campaigns, for the more members they acquire
the greater their bargaining power.

This, in turn, has caused

an expansion of the proportion of the populace represented in
the decision making process.

This representation by sector

strength has caused the Popular Sector to emerge as the. dom
inate sector, for excluding the farm and labor elements of
society, the Popular Sector can claim to represent virtually
the whole of Mexico.^

However, the farm and labor sectors

possess considerable power and cannot be neglected in a
review of the sectors.
The Farm Sector came into existence in 1938 when the
National Campesino Confederation (CMC), the national farmers
organization:..., signed a pact of unity which M bestowed upon
a central organisi® the power of liaison and national
representation.
The CNC, the largest interest group in Mexico, is the
major associational group of the Farm Sector.

It represents

2,332,914 e.jido families and 150,000 sindicatos campesinos,
organized wage-laborers.

The CNC remains dominant in the

Farm Sector, but another group, the Sociedad Agronomica,
comprised of professional agronomists and having a membership
of 10,000 was added in 1952.^
■^Needier, op. cit. , pp. 309-311.
Brandenburg, gjg. cit., p. 177.
3

Scott, op. cit., p. 166.

-34The CNC extends from the national to the state levels.
At the national level, the National Elective Committee of
14 members, the National Convention of 160 members, the
Mexican Agronomers Society, and the League of Agrarian
Communities and Campesino Unions of '32. members, preside
over the CNC.

At the state or regional level, the Regional

Campesino Committees, totalling 512 persons, administer CNC
control.

And at the local level of the e.iido. control is

vested in the Ejido Commisariats and the Boards of
Vigilance.^
The close cooperation between the government and the
CNC is notable.

The party’s national Secretary of Agrarian

Action, a member of the CEC,receives instruction from the
heads of the CNC and informs them of important CEC delib
erations. 2

in the Federal District, and at state and local

levels, CNC members serve on the party committees.

The CNC

structure, parallel to that of the party, permits the CNC
close participation ihotheideliberaiioasianieeleotions ©fothe
PRI.3
Within the Labor Sector, the Confederacion de
TraSaiadores. Mexlcanos ■(CTM) represents 1,500',000 workers.

i

Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 178.

^Ibid., p . 185.

^Ibid., p. 186.

-35The CTM along with the Confederacies Regional de Obreros
Mexicanos (CROM), the Confederaci^n General de Txaba.jadores
(CGT), the railroad workers, the mining and metal workers,
the petroleum workers, and other independent unions!form'the
Bloque de Unidad Obrera (BUG) and comprise eighty-five,

per

cent of the Labor Sector, with a total membership of
1,873,000.

Within the Labor Sector is an opposing faction

called the anti-BUO bloc.
be leftist oriented.

This bloc is commonly thought to

It is headed by the Confederacion

Revolucionaria de Qbreros y Campesinos (CROC) which is sup
ported by the Conf ederacion Revolucionaria de Txaba.jadores
(CRT), an electrical workers union, and other independent
unions. -*•
The CTM's strength as the largest union in the Labor
Sector can be observed by the fact that since the formation
of the party, the PRI’s national head of Labor Activities
has been a CTM leader.2
The CTM’s organization, based upon politico-territorial
divisions of Mexico, allows it to participate directly in
party activities, and it can be noted that CTM members are
present in the internal elections of the official party.

At

■the head of the labor hierarchy, the National Executive
Committee of the Confederation, comprised of ten men,presides.
^Scott, op. cit. , pp. 164-168.
o
Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 216.

-36Subordinate to it are the 32 federaci^nes estatales, which
embrace the states, territories, and the Federal District.
Regional federations,

(federacidnes regionals) and local fed

erations (federaci<^nes municipales) complete the structure.
The Popular Sector headed by the National
Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) which differs
from the other two sector’s controlling organs, in that the
CNOP is preeminently a political

o r g a n .

2

Since the Popular

Sector represents practically all the interests of Mexican
society which are not included in the farm and labor sectors,
it is the largest sector with 6,621,000 members.

And as

mentioned previously, because of its numerical strength, it
has become the sector with the greatest representation in
the Senate and Federal Assembly.

The CNOP contains within

its ten divisions the Bureaucrats Union (FSTSE) which is
favored by the government.

In addition to this powerful

interest group, the Popular Sector is divided into nine other
sections: the cooperatists, small farmers, small industri
alists, small merchants, prof@ssionals--intellectuals, youth
groups, feminine groups, artisans, and diversified.

The last

one is a catch-all category designed to incorporate any new
1Ibid., pp. 217-219.
2Ibid., p. 236.
^Scott, op. cit., p. 170.

-37interests ox previously unaffiliated Mexicans.

It may be

noted that because of the Popular Sector’s envelopment of
the greater portion of Mexican interests, and the ever in
creasing number of interests which seek PRI affiliation, this
Popular Sector will most likely continue to expand and grow
in itself and in relation to the other two sectors.
From the preceding pages, it can be observed that the
structural organization of the PRI has provided the party
with a centralized, hierarchically structured, political
machine.

Through this machine, the PRI has set itself

$s a

symbol of mutual interest and has sought to facilitate the
flow of information and to reconcile the conflicting opinions
among groups and leaders at all levels of government.^
It is significant that the party has formed such a
machine, for in essence it is within the interaction of this
party machine and its dealings with fhe government that one
finds democratic action and participation in Mexican politics.
Neither the Congress nor the ballot have evolved as centers
for political action, but it is in the intra-party struggles
where the real contest occurs.
The predominant considerations in the architecture
of Mexican "revolutionary*' political institutions from
the standpoint of opportunities for popular participation
have focused primarily on the intergroup and
’'‘Padgett, "Mexico’s One-Party System,", p. 999.
2
Padgett, "Popular Participation m the Mexican
One-Party System,", pp. 260-261.

-38interpersonal relationships linking the groups in
government with the directive committees of the Party
on the one hand and with the leadership of the organized
"revolutionary1' interest of functional groupings on the
other.1
Political action revolves around the executive office at
national,state, and local levels, and party committees at the
national, regional, and municipal levels.

It is within'and

among these institutions that the sector committees at the
corresponding level must deal to secure their desires or to
eradicate conflicts.
Such an arrangement has made it especially impor
tant that there be an opportunity on the part of the
rank and file members of the associated 'revolutionary'
groups to express choice with regard to committee
leadership of the respective organizations.
It has been
these committees working closely with key personnel in
governraent--especially with members of the executive
branch and with the committees of the Paity--who have
made the decisions concerning candidates for succession
to public office. And the same has been true of de-'
cision making in other diverse areas such as ejido
credit, community schools, the expansion as well as
improvement of administration of labor benefits and the
procurement of low cost housing.3
The apex of the hierarchical structure at each level is
the executive; at the local, he is the mayor, at the state,
the governor, and at the nation, the president.

At each level

the executive acts as the great center to which the sectors
and party committees can submit their measures, and problems
1lbid.
^Ibid., p. 262.
^Ibid., p. 261.

-39for approval and arbitration.

Although executives at lower

levels are increasingly making more and more decisions, they
are nevertheless subject to intervention from the next higher
level of government.
The ultimate power rests in the office of the president
of Mexico; most often the major measures of legislation and
the most pertinent problems are sent to his office.

Since

the interests of Mexico have been increasing, it is difficult
for any one individual such as the president to handle all
matters directly.

Consequently, he has begun to allocate

responsibility to others and to rely upon their advice in
making his decisions.

The eighteen line departments and many

independent or semi-independent agencies perform such duties.
The work of these is coordinated by the agency known as the
Presidential Office (Secretaria de la Presidencia).^
In addition to the Presidential Office, there has been
a recent tendency for the president to organize consultative
agencies.

One such important ..agency has been the Council for

Development and Coordination of National Production (Conse.io
de Fomento y Coordinacii^n de la Producci^n Nacional).

Its

duty is to bring together thfe representatives of agriculture
and industry to discuss their common difficulties and to rec
ommend their solutions to the president.
noted that rather;

(Thus, it may be

than being a real part of the policy

"^Scott, 0£. cit. . pp. 278-288.

-40making machinery of the presidency as the Presidential Office,
these consultative agencies are auxiliary agencies in

exec

utive decision making.) Such consultative agencies are carried
down to lower executive levels also.1

It is the executive

and his office which in the end are left to formulate the
important policy and to help the sectors to compromise and
agree.

However, the importance of the party committees, which

work as the main intermediaries between the sectors and the
executive and his office, must not be neglected.
The CEC, as the national party committee, has assumed
the role as "chief arbiter throughout the entire range of
intra-Party difficulties."

2

The CEC has played a particularly

important position in the settlement of intra-party electoral
assemblies.

The president of the CEC with the help of the

CEC secretary general and the Pireci6n de Asuntos Juridicos
(the CEC agency which is concerned with the validity of elec
toral assemblies decisions) has to resolve the rivalries
among the sectors in the intra-party elections and to report
to the president of Mexico the list of delegates which he
believes to be qualified and entitled to receive the PRI nom
ination for Congress.

The decision the CEC president submits

to the president of Mexico is usually approved by the president of Mexico, for the CEC president

is usually a trusted

1Ibid. , pp. 289-291..
2
Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican OneParty System", pp. 117-118.
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friend of the Mexican president and provides a direct link
between the hierarchy of the party and the summit of the
executive branch.
The Regional Committees of the PRI serve as agencies
to smooth over intra-party conflict at the state and local
levels.

And here too at intra-party election time, the

regional president and his committee are most important
in the process of selecting what candidates of the sector’s
axe qualified for municipal offices.

( It may be noted that

the president of the regional party is usually a personal
A

friend of the governor.)

CHAPTER IV
PRI AND STABILITY
In addition to the organizational structure of the PRI,
there are other factors which help to insure the continuance
of the Mexican one-party system.

The ensuing pages deal with

these elements of stability.
PRI*s Identif ication with the Government
There is extensive overlapping and interaction between
the party and the government.

The president of Mexico is

simultaneously the head of the government and of the PRI.
Government officials are active in the sectors of the

PRI

and are most often chosen from the ranks of the sectors.

It

may be of particular note to emphasize again that the civil
servants of the government comprise an associational interest
group within the Popular Sector of the PRI.
To the Mexican citizen, the PRI and the government are
as one."*" Because the party overlaps almost entirely with the
formal agencies of government, it has acquired the name of
"'"Scott, op. cit., p. 136.
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-43the "official party."

Scott noted:

Identification of the official party with the state
became so confused in the minds of the party bosses that
the Supreme Court was forced to remind them in one case
that "the PRM is not a dependency of the federal exec
utive power; . . . it does not constitute an official
service . . . so its thirty per cent discount ( on tele
phone service ) cannot be enforced by legal- means.'
As late as 1950, President Aleman issued an exec
utive decree assigning "the property known as the ex
chapel of La Milagrosa in Guadalajara, Jalisco, to the
service of the state, to install the offices of the
PRI.1
In order to understand to the fullest extent the partygovernment identity, the three main branches of the govern
ment, the executive, legislative, and judicial should be
amined.

ex

Since the formation of the party, the president of

Mexico has been a party member and has received overwhelming
majorities in the elections.

The following is a list of the

per cent of the votes cast in the presidential elections for
the PRI candidates: Pascual Ortiz Rubio, 93.56; L^zaro
Cardenas, 98; Avila Camacho, 93.1; Miguel Aleman, 80.1;
f
Ruiz Cortines, 76.4; Lopea Mateos 90.4; and Diaz Ordaz 89.
The power of the office of the Mexican president has
been strengthened by the tradition of authoritarianism, by
a broad grant of constitutional powers, and by the president’s
position as head of the political machinery in Mexico.^
1Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 247.

-44Authoritarianism in Mexico, as in other Latin American
countries, continues to play a significant role.

This aspect

of Spanish colonial influence is still felt; it is apparent
that the president’s power is similar to that of the royal
colonial regimes.
A number of us who have seen peasant delegations
waiting for.the President of Mexico . . . have been
struck by the fact that we: were watching the General
Indian Court of New Spain functioning today rather
much as it must have when Antonio de Mendoza gave it
informal existence or Luis de Velasco II gave it
formal structure. JThe authoritarian aspect of the presidency can be seen
in the fact that no official figure at a local, state, or
national level can remain in his position if he does not
conform with the president’s policy.

Nol: only that, but

the president's influence extends to the making or breaking
of leaders of the Mexican interest groups.2
For labor and agrarian leaders, and even for the
representatives of the growing business and manufac
turing interests outside the PRI, his power to recog
nize strikes, to grant or refuse road or irrigation
projects, to remit state and municipio debts to the
national government , to apply or relax taxes or trade
regulations, and all the other discretionary decisions
he can render make the president master of their
destinies.^
Woodrow Borah, Charles Gibson, and Robert A. Potash,
’’Colonial Institutions And Contemporary Latin America,”
Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (August, 1963), ;
374.
^Scott, ojg. cit. , p. 259.
^Ibid., p. 261.

-45The systematization and formalization of the political
machinery of the PRI plus the growth of functional interest
associations outside the PRI’s margins have called for a force
to evolve which can synthesize and compromise these interests
for effective articulation and aggregation.'*'
been

the president of Mexico.

This force has

But because of the broadening

of the base of interests, the president relies on the aid of
organizations which have evolved within the office of the
presidency.

These agencies have evolved primarily for their

technical competence and political adaptability.

Among

these agencies are the following eighteen executive depart
ments: Government, Foreign Affairs, Treasury, National ;
Defense, Marine Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture
and Animal Industry, Water Resources, Public Education,
Health and Aid, Labor and Welfare, National Patrimony,
Communications and Transport, Public Works, Presidency;
and the three departamentos: Tourism, Agrarian and
Colonization Affairs and Federal D i s t r i c t . ^

And as mentioned,

many independent and semi-independent agencies and the Office
of the President have arisen which help manage government
affairs and coordinate government activity.
However, in the end, it is the president with whom the
responsibility lies.

It is he who controls the basic

^Ibid., p. 246.
2Ibid., p . 281i
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operations of the office of the presidency and profoundly
influences the other branches of government.

It is evident

that the president has used his constitutional grant to act
on legi.slative matters to the fullest extent.

In fact, it is

said, ‘•"The Congress is itself but a creature of the President,
and all the extensive powers of that legislative body must be
subsumed under the executive branch."1
The Congress has been termed as not more than a rubber
stamp of approval, for it receives bills which have already
been discussed, debated, and decided by the executive.
Privately sponsored bills are rare and have little chance of
being passed; only government inspired measures get the green
light in Congress.
The Congress is PRI controlled.

The Senate, with but

one exception, is composed of partisans of the PRI.

The

Chamber of Deputies , although allowing for the seating of
opposition candidates, is comprised mainly of party people.
Even with the new electoral laws providing for a proportional
representation system, the PRI in the 1964 Congress controlled
175 delegates compared to the 35 delegates of the three oppo
sition parties.^

Although there is speculation that the

i

■^James L. Busey, Latin America: Political Institutions
and Processes (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 30-31.
2
"Mexico." Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 8
(October , 1964), 687.
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increase of representatives of 'opposition parties might
encourage debate in the Chambers, it is still generally held
that these seats are but honorary bestowals and will not
disrupt the rubber-stamp organ.
The President and the Senate, by a majority vote, select
the members of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court chooses

the judges at inferior levels; however, it is usually con
tended that the PRI and executive branch aid them in their
selections.
The Mexican judges are subject to removal by a majority
vote of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and upon recom
mendation of the p r e s i d e n t . ^
It is generally held that the Mexican courts refrain
from rendering judgments which would be contrary to PRI
policy.
It is clear that the courts never take a position
contrary to that of executive policy. No writs of
amparo issue against actions by the President, by
members of his official family, by leading members of
the PRI; or against federal legislation which has been
passed by the Congress.3
It is thus observed that the PRI can be identified with
the major branches of the Mexican government, for the execu
tive, legislative and judicial branches are managed and
t

^Busey, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
2Ibid.. p. 39.

3Ibid.
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controlled by party affiliates.

The official party has not

only identified itself with the goals of the government but
has managed to do the same with the ideals of the Mexican
people, the goals of the Revolution of 1910.
The PRI and the Revolution
The Mexican nation of todayiidentifiesii&seifwwiihTthe
Revolution of 1910.

This revolutionary movement was begurl

by an intellectual element

and supported by the middle class.

It is difficult to define the Revolution in terms of strict
ideology, for at the time it begun it had none.

All of its

leaders voiced different ideals and it was a combination of
these that later became correlated with the goals of the
Revolution.

The ideas most associated with the Revolution are

found in the Constitution of 1917; they are: effectual suf
frage, agrarian reform, non-reelection of the president, anticlericalism, an exclusion of the Church from politics,

im

provement of the Indian class, and finally, the expulsion of
the foreign imperialist from Mexico.^
The PRI has managed to become so identified with the
goals of the Revolution that a vote against it is similar to
voting against the ideas of Mexican patriotism.

Since 1929

when Calles gathered the diverse interests of the Revolution
^Harold Eugene Davis, Government and Politics in
Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958),
p. 134.

-49into a single party, the party has been the guardian of the
Revolution.
This Revolution still has values in Mexico, for it
remains as a unifying force and has set broad outlines for
the party's platform.

It acts as a restraint against

excesses of private development, keeps alive issues such as
investment in the public sector, and land reform, and,
finally, lays down the basic'operating procedure for labor
laws, secular education, social welfare, e.iido reform and
the principal of no re-election for the president.i
The party has been adept in its ability to adapt
the Revolution to changing circumstances.^

This can be

attributed, in large part, to the fact that the Revolution
is not held to any rigid ideology.

This adaptability has

additional advantages since the lack of an orthodox
political creed and the open nature of the party allows it
to exist free from the spiritual aridity of a closed system
and terrorism.3
The party and its identification with the Revolution
have had an important psychological effect upon the Mexican
people.

In The Civic Culture, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba
^Botsford, op. cit.. p. 14
o
Alexander, op. cit., p. 117.

^Octavio Paz, "The Mexican Revolution Today,"
Dissent IX, No. 4 (Autumn, 1962), 328.

-50conclude that pride in the Mexican nation is dependent to a
considerable extent on the continuing symbolic identification
with the Revolution.

They found that the Mexican people have

a great sense of political pride which can be traced to the
i1

Revolution; 65 per cent of those interviewed could name goals
of the Revolution.

Upon further questiondngo, 61 ppr cent
'i

stated that they felt the Revolution was continuing while
only 25 per cent felt that its goals had been realized and
14 per cent felt that they had been forgotten.1
The overwhelming success of the PRI in every election is
the product of this seemingly mystical commitment to the
Revolution.

The party has been able to personify and define

the Revolution.

But in addition, it is notedthat, thexPEI's

success is also a product of fence-mending and political
maneuvering.^

This political maneuvering has been an attempt

of the official party to achieve unanimity.
PRI and Unanimity
The PRI seeks to lessen the power of other political
actors by embracing the political spectrum's center and by
alloting to each faction within the party a definite area
■^Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:
Political Attitudes And Democracy In Five Nations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press’^ 1963), p. 104.
^Taylor, oja. cit., pp. 723-729.

-51in which it may '’legitimately, though always within the
rnajority--exert its pressure." ~ /It presents.>t'<b,~the_ pppg&ition
the idea ©f, "Why fight us? Join us and continue your struggle
within the majority, for only the majority has effective
power.”2
The party has sought to achieve this unanimity by ’
JbSoacfening and making more democratic the basis of party
membership, and has also tried to represent the interests of
Mexico whether they are within the party’s official ranks or
are outside the PRI’s .membership.
PRI and Democracy
f-

_

Foreign observers view the party as democratic in that
the PRI is a "rambling coalition of social groups and politr
ical views, from right wing Catholic to Marxist socialist,
and reflects reasonably accurately the forces and trends in
the country.
A democratizing process within the party can be observed
by its broadening of representation within its ranks.

The

government has continued to represent progressively more and
more people.4

The PRI has attempted to incorporate groups

^Botsford, gjg. cit. , p. 15.
^Ibid., p. 14.
3
"Battle Tremors in the Model State," The Economist,
CCIV (August 25, 1962), 706.

4

Cline, op. cit., p. 420.

-52into its sectors which heretofore had been politically
apathetic or unable to be legally affiliated with parties
and elections.

Although the youth section of the PRI had

grown to 78,000 members, in 1962 the party chairman,
Alfonso Corona del Roral, urged more youth participation.
Recruitment of membership is advocated and active programs
for youth training are being carried on at the Centrol de
Qrientacion Politica in Mexico City.

Also, proposals are

made for increasing the number of PRI sponsored centers for
economic, political, and social studies.1

President Mateos

made an effort to integrate the Indian, currently comprising
about 15 per cent of Mexico’s population, into Mexico’s
cultural and economic life.

Through his efforts, Indian

schools increased from 2,000 in 1958 to 3,900 in 1961.^
These examples of recruitment of more citizens into active
Mexican society are but a small sample of the total Mexican
scene.

In transitional societies the ever:, increasing indus

trial and urban population, trying to gain access and seek
their objectives through political activity, have influenced
the make-up of political parties.
sition is apparent.
to cities and towns.

That Mexico is in

tran

Peasants from rural areas are flocking
Mexico, since 1900, has changed from

■'■"Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 3
(May, 1962), 206. ^'’Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 1
(March, 1962), 16.

-53a country in which the rural population was 90 per cent to a
country in which the rural inhabitants make up 54 per cent of
the country's population.

A United Nations survey predicts

that by 1980 Mexico will be even more urban with 62 per cent
of its population located in the cities.
Mexico City has added two million citizens to her
population since 1940 and the number of cities with over
100,000 people rose to nine in 1950.2

This exodus from the

rural area has been caused by lack of land and employment and
by the promise of work in industrial centers.

Although slums

and low living conditions have come with the mass migration
to the cities, the cities have been offering a new type of
life to the workers add have introduced them to the factors
of transition and modernization.

As social mobilization

continues, people, becoming more dependent upon government
services and political decisions, often seek to articulate
their interests by increasing their political participation.^
The new way of life sets a higher value on
economic and social success, both pf which may be
identified with political activity and certainly can
be increased by organization of and action through^
i

New. York Times, June 24, 1962, Section VI, p. 24.
O

‘‘"Scott, op. cit., p. 481.
3

Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3
(September, 1961), 499.
4Scott, o£. cit., p. 50.

-54special interest groups* Urbanization, therefore,
is a vital ally of Westernization in making Mexicans
aware of government and in broadening the base upon
which Mexico’s government rests.1
By broadening its base of political participation,
Mexico appears to become more democratic in its represen
tation; yet there are other factors which also seem
that Mexico is democratizing.

to show

As mentioned, the party has

become institutionalized and through its machinery of com
mittees and sectors it has been able to reach out and allow
more and more participation from the grass roots elements.
It is of crucial importance that the party offers democracy
within its own ranks; this can be noted in the active com
petition among the sectors for legislative seats and gov
ernment favor.2
Professor Fitzgibbon, by the use of specialized
techniques of IBM computers which provide ranking on com
posite scores, sought to measure the extent to which Latin
American countries are democratic.

In his questionnaries,

he asked about freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the
responsibility of the government to its citizens.

Out of

the total of twenty nations, Mexico rose from a rank of
seventh in 1956 to fifth in 1960.

And among nations with a

noticeable amount of Indian background it rated first.^
1IMd.
p
Botsford, op. cit., p. 39.
3
Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution To Evolution
(New York: Oxford University Press’^ 1962), p. 172.

-55Another indication that Mexico is becoming more demo
cratic is that the settlement of disputes is not accomplished
by force but rather by administration and law-enforcement.

A

peaceful succession to leadership positions has evolved and a
wider participation in policy formation is apparent.
Local and state political bosses (caciques) are becoming
fewer as popular leaders of the people are replacing the
imposed leaders of the past.

Caudillismo is being replaced

by the machinery of the political system; even the rule of the
president is becoming less personal.

The president of Mexico

is not seen in the role of a charismatic leader, but rather
in the role of a less personal, semiconstitutional, mechanis
tic leader who must integrate and synchronize the formal and
informal machinery of government,. 2

This change from personal

power to power of the political party also resulted in a more
peaceful transfer of office in elections.

It is notable, that

there have been no armed attempts to resist election outcomes
since General Saturino Cedillo1s unsuccessful attempt .in
1938.3

In the 1964 presidential elections there was not a

major uprising or demonstration and for the first time the
opposition candida±e formally conceded the election.4
■'"Needier, pp. cit.. p. 308.

2

Scott, op. cit.. p. 246.

3
4

Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 165.

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVII, No. 8
(October, 1964), 688.

Attempts were made in the 1964 elections to reform the
electoral process and offer some opportunity for minority
parties to obtain Congressional representation.

Minority

parties gaining 2.5 per cent of the total vote are allowed 5
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one additional seat for
each 5 per cent over the first 2.5 per cent.^

As mentioned,

this change resulted in the gain of 35 seats in the Chambers
for the opposition.
In its quest for unanimity, the PRI has begun to guide
its actions toward a more democratic system.

It has sought

a broader base for popular political participation and has
begun to listen more to the grass roots element.

It has

allowed interplay and competition within the elements of the
party.

It has started to abandon personal rule and has tried

to rely upon administration and law-enforcement.

And finally,

it has made an attempt to make elections more democratic.
Interests Within the PRI
;.;The PRI has tried to incorporate the major interests
of Mexico into its three party sectors, farm, labor and
popular.
The inclusion of a Farm Sector within the party seemed
justifiable for land reform was a major cry of the Revolution.
Land reform has continued to remain high on the government’s
^New York Times, January 11, 1963, p. 4.

-57priority list.

Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 stated

that land belongs to the nation and that the nation continues
to have jurisdiction over it.

When monopolies came into

existence, the Revolution designated the state to rectify
them.

Three reform approaches were presented;

(l) return the

lost communal holdings to the villages. (e,iido), (2) give each
family free private plots, and (3) maintain a mixture in which
haciendas would be allowed to continue to exist but small
plots of land would be given to the worker to supplement his
earnings on the hacienda.

Administrations have been

irreso

lute as to what method they should use for agrarian reform;
however, the three preceding approaches have generally

con

stituted the bases for action.1
Mexican presidents from Cardenas through Mateos have
attempted to satisfy the rural elements by distributing
48.3 million hectares of land among the farm peasant pop
ulation.

(it may be noted that in the Mateos Administration

alone, 16 million hectares were distributed.)

Yet in spite

of these attempts to satisfy the rural elements, much dis
satisfaction remains and lately invasions of landless peas
ants, paracaidistas, onto lands which they claim to be
rightfully theirs, has taken place.

This and other examples

have made the party aware of the rural unrest.
1

-■ r -

■

President
■

-

^Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, pp. 209-213.

-58Diaz Qrdaz, during his campaign and in his inagural address,
made it known that the agricultural sector would be a key
concern of his administration.

He recognized the signs of

unrest in the rural areas as a threat to national equilibrium,
and pledged himself to rectify these

difficulties.^

Diaz

noted that agrarian reform could not

indefinitely satisfy

the peasant's hope for lands because

in regions where the

land had been divided such land reform was impossible.

t

He

urged voluntary cooperation, proper functioning of rural
groups through village communalism and rejected the concept
of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . 2

The party, in previous administrations,

has realized as had Diaz Ordaz that land distribution is not
the over-all solution for the agrarian problem and have c 1.
offered a revised program for agricultural reform: (l) land
must be distributed on a more rational base,

(2) new re

sources should be created through irrigation and hydraulic
projects,

(3) areas heretofore unexploited should be open

to colonization,

(4) agricultural techniques must be mod

ernized and be aided by- technical assistance, and (5) pro-"
duction must be regenerated by providing the small and medium
size owners with benefits similar to those emjoyed by the
^New York Times. January 22, 1965, p. 54.
2

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No.
(October, 1964), 497.
~ ~ r

~
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-59e.iido and the small farmer. JTo help the distribution of land on a more rational
base, the Agrarian Code of 1949 was passed.

This code

rectified the problem of the distribution of economically
unproductive small parcels of land (minifundia).

It

stipulated that a minimum of 10 hectares of land must
constitute an e.iido g r a n t . 2

Presidents Mateos and Ordaz

have complied to this law in their distribution of land.
Since President Camacho's administration, Mexico has
initiated large scale irrigation;:1arid' hydroelectric projects.
Such projects as Tepalcatepec and Papalopan

have helped to

bring the total of cultivated, irrigated lends in Mexico to
42 million acres.

And hydroelectric'installations.such as

Infiernillo and the Maipaso have bought Mexico's power sysQ
tern to around 6 million kilowatts.
In an effort to open unexploited areas to coloni
zation, Lopez Mateos introduced the idea of distributing
forest lands to the e.iidatarios.

Such projects in Durango,

Guerrero, and Michoacan have proved most successful.4
"'‘Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 213.
2Ibid.. p . 214.
3
New York Times, January 22, 1965, p. 54
4

"Mexico,” Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 5
(July, 1964), 401.

In

-60addition, an attempt to relieve the heavily populated central
plateau area by encouraging resettlement of farmers in the
sparsely settled Quintana Roo was instigated by the govern
ment. JThe government has tried to improve rural Mexico by
introducing it to the elements of modernization and technical
agrarianism.

Efforts have been made to train students to

help fill the need for agrarian technicians.

One hundred

training centers, which will educate 10,000 to 15,000 persons
annually in new farming techniques, have been established.^
Attempts to introduce light industry into the rural area
can be seen in the establishment of such projects as the $16
million cellulose industry in San Luis Potosi and the rope
making industry in the Y u c a t a n . 3

Projects in industry and

self-community projects have provided many new positions for
the rural unemployed.
Credit to the eiidos is needed if the elements of
technical agrarianism are to continue.

However, elements

of corruption have effected the Banco Agrario and the Banco
Ejidal.

To

stop

injustices

in

credit. .

management,

^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 1
(March, 1962), 16.

2

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 5
(july, 1964), 399.
^Ibid.

-61Diaz Ordaz has urged the formation of groups of peasants who
would watch over credit operations.1
Production of agricultural products has been aided
greatly by larger agricultural holdings.

The government has

given special assurances of protection from paracaidistas1
tactics to the larger landholders who were engaged in the
raising of badly needed crops.

To .stimulate cattle-bre'eding,

large landowners were also protected.2
Thus, it may be noted that in addition to the distri?

bution of e.iido

lands, the Mexican government has embarked

on the five point program previously described.
such a program as this five point plan, the

By adopting

government has

used modern methods and technical means to aid the agrarian
workers.

The party has also been aware of the urban workers

who are continually evolving as a powerful force in Mexican
society.
The Labor Sector, as the Farm Sector, has been a part
of the party since its origin.

Article 123 of the 1917

Constitution has been labor's revolutionary code or its Magna
Carta, for by it the labor movement gained recognition.

Since

that time, labor although not a captive, has been cJdf.p,endent
upon government to an extensive degree.
1Ibid.
2
Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, pp. 210-215.

-62In return for its recognition and acceptance by party
and government, labor has had to acknowledge certain limi
tations: (1) it can not engage in all-out warfare against
industry, and (2) it must not, in an effort to obtain better
wages and conditions, exert full economic pressures against
the government.

The government weighs the claims of labor

for better wages against such things as the national con
sideration of trade balances, export prices or the standard
of domestic prices and decides from this whether labor is
entitled to its request.

The Minister of Labor is the chief

consultant for labor in deciding wages or conditions, and
the policy he imposes must be accepted.^
Although labor is allowed to strike, the Minister of
Labor determines the extent and range of the strikes.
Lopez Mateos acknowledged labor's right to strike in the
following statement: "Mexican laws uphold the workers' right
to strike, and the men |fho govertt

Mexico.respect, and will

demand that others respect this right, when it is

legiti

mately i n v o k e d . But Mateos added that the workers should
strike inside the law and that demonstrations outside the
law were betraying the working class.
1Ibid.. p. 226.
2
Ibid., p. 227. citing, "The Labor Policy of Lopez
Mateos' Administration in the Government of Mexico, a brief
speech . . . July 29, 1959 ( Mexico, 1959 )."

-63Mexican labor disputes are mostlycsoMeditirlitfioutoise^ieas
or prolonged strikes.

A period which exemplifies the con

ciliatory method was noted when Lopez Mateos, prior to his
election as president in 1958, was Minister of Labor.

At

that time, 60,000 labor disputes were settled without a sig
nificant strike.^-

But shortly after his resignation, a series

of wild-cat strikes took place that continued on through the
elections of 1958 and finally had to be subdued with forceful
measures.

Since that period, however, there have been no

major demonstrations.

Lopez Mateos as president could boast

that from 1959-1960, out of a total of 1,437 threatened ::
p
strikes only fourteen were consummated.
The government has aided labor by extending benefits
of social security, unemployment compensation, old age and
survivors insurance.

It has also helped to set minimum wages,

and has succeeded in getting labor a share of the profits of
industry.3

An illustrative example of this is a recent law

passed by Congress which introduced a new sharing plan that
would permit workers to share in company profits.

A national

commission comprised of officials from labor, management and
government

would be established to decide the amount of

^Taylor, op., cit., p. 726.
^Cline, loc cit.
^Brandenburg, pp. cit., pp. 233-234.

-64profit which labor would be allowed to share.

It was also

the duty of this commission to exempt certain industries or
companies from this profit sharing for a limited time.

Or

ganized labor regarded the new sharing plan as the fulfill
ment of a long awaited dream.

The same Congress also

ini

tiated the labor reform which prohibited child labor under
fourteen years of age.^Within the Labor Sector, the CTM, by far the largest
of the unions, has since 1941 shared its political spoils
and offices with the lesser unions in the section.

This

benevolent attitude may, however, be nothing more than an
attempt* of the official party and the CTM to keep minor
unions staisfied so they will not affiliate with opposition
parties.^
The Popular Sector has surpassed the other two sectors,
numerically

and in political strength.

This can be attrib

uted' to the fact that it is the Popular Sector which repre
sents the middle class.

Since 1940, this class, as a by

product of industrialization and urbanization, has risen to
constitute about 20 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n . 3

Authorities

have observed that the class structure of Mexico is affected
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 1
(March, 1962), 15.
2
Brandenburg, p|>* cit., pp. 228-229.
3
Richard N. Adams, et. ajL. Social Change In Latin
America Today (New York: Harper & Brothers, 196DX p« 336.

-65by modernization.

Glass polarization is evident at the top

with the aristocrats arid at the bottom with the primative
Indian; however, it is the middle class that is in the process
of transition.

It is within this flexible, elastic, class

structure of the middle class that the greatest amount of
social mobilization is taking place.
Urban class stratification is more fluid and although
there is a discernable distinction between the highest and
lowest classes within the urban society, there is a vagueness
as to where lines can be drawn in regards to the middle c.
class.^

^

Within this class there is greater opportunity for

social mobility,

It is this class which realizes the quest

for more formalized organization that often gives rise to
more voluntary groups.

On the whole, these voluntary as

sociations of society are supported by middle class persons
who show a basic social stability and it is the middle class
of society to which the urban region relies for leadership
and stability.

3

Urbanization has brought a tendency for the formation of
voluntary groups. ^

Floyd Dotson, in his study of Guadalajara,

^Borah, ojo. cit.. p. 388.

2

Alvin Boskoff, The Sociology of Urban Regions
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962j^ pp. 194-196.
^Ibid.. pp. 172-189.
^Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 349-350.

-6 6 found that appearance of voluntary organizations was corre
lated with the urban growth of the last fifty years and that
there was in general a direct relationship between socio
economic status and participation.

Membership affiliation

was most often seen in the upper and middle classes.-*Consequently, it can be deduced from these studies that
within transitional Mexico, a middle class is emerging.

It

is this class that is becoming active in Mexican society by
forming voluntary associations and by rising to the fore to
lead and stabilize the Mexican nation.

Thus the importance

of the inclusion of this middle class into the Popular Sector
should not be overlooked.
The high degree of political activity of the Popular
Sector's middle class provides a link among conflicting
groups; it is necessary to the function of a complex, modern
society.

The middle class continues to advance because of -|ts

political initiative and ability compared to the general
apathy found in the lower classes and the mass.

The middle

class is progressively growing in importance; cultural change,
social mobilization and political recruitment will bring peo
ple from the mass into the middle class.

The Popular Sector

will correspondingly expand to be used as the main political
I

'

;

:

~

1

Floyd Dotson, "A Note On Participation In Voluntary
Associations In A Mexican City," American Sociological
Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (August, 1953), 380-381.

~

-67mechanism of the small town and urban middle class to obtain
their objectives and to manipulate the political process.

It

is stated that the middle-class is the core of the Popular
Sector.

Within the last few years, the Popular Sector has

emerged as the most powerful of the three PRI sectors and has
come to equate in political power the

combined interests of

the farm and labor sectors.
The Popular Sector has become politically powerful for
numerous reasons.

As previously mentioned, it has begun to

represent the middle class which is at present constantly
expanding in importance.

It has, through numerical repre

sentation, exceeded the other sectors in almost every federal
organization and has achieved a clear majority among party
O
members in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
And finally,
it has had within its ranks the government bureaucrat!s union,
the FSTSE.

The advantageous position which this and the other

middle class interest groups enjoy within the Popular Sector
encourages them to support the status quo.
It may be of particular interest to note the benefits
the FSTSE has received from the government.

In the period

of 1952-1958, over 300,000 government bureaucrats were given
special advantages in the form of year-end bonuses, cost- ofliving grants, and raises which totaled over 75 million
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
2

Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 281.

-6 8 dollars.

In addition, low-cost housing, their own hospital

and a 50 per cent rebate on drugs were provided.-1

Scholar

ships, and trips abroad were also given to FSTSE members.^
The CNOP, as the political organization of the Popular
Sector, has been the most successful of the three sector or
ganizations .in' obtaining its objectives for its middle class
membership.
John J. Johnson observes that the Revolution has shifted
from left of center to right of center and finally rests on
dead center.

He explains that these adjustments have been

made with ease because of the steadying influence of Mexico’s
middle groups.3

Needier also notes the ascension of power of

the Popular Sector and its middle class and has stated that
this development has tended to reenforce the position of
moderation which has been reflected in the actions of presi
dents Gortines and Mateos.

The seats of the Popular Sector

in Congress have been most often assigned to lawyers who
continue to take a conservative stand in vi-ew of the middle
of the road views of the middle class.^
^"Scott, op. cit., p. 81.
O
Brandenburg, op., cit.. pp. 279-280.
3
Scott, op. cit., p. 90.
4
John J. Johnson, "Middle Groups In National Politics
in Latin America," Hispanic American Historical Review.
XXVII (August, 1957), 318.

-69Although the party has ridden the center line, it has
in its intra-party relations, granted concessions to groups
to the right and to the left in its quest for unanimity.

As

a whole, however, the extreme groups within the party have
served as scouting parties which have helped to relate to
the party the current strength and support that the left and
right elements enjoy.

The degree of support that these

r

groups obtain from "public opinion" or uncommitted groups
within the party aid the party in the determination of its
course. ^
In Mexico PRI is the source of all political power;
PRI, that conglomeration of rightists, leftists,
business men, and union bosses rivited together by
realpolitik.
The President and crushing majorities
of both houses of Congress are always members of the
PRI. ' Thus, the real struggle between the Right and
the Left goes on, more or less silently but none the
less grimly, inside the PRI--not at the polls. What
happens at the polls is a foregone conclusion, with
minor modifications.
Interests Outside the PRI
The party is aware not only of the dangerous pressures
that exist within it but also of the external forces.

Con

sequently the daily operation of government in Mexico

in

volves a process of consultation, conciliation and compro
mise between the formal political structure of the PRI and
the "outside" interests.'

The party has tried to embrace

"^Botsford, gja. cit.. p. 15.

^David L. Graham, "The Rise of the Mexican Right,"
Yale Review. LII, No. 1 (October, 1962) 110.

,

-70these outside interests and has attempted to show them that
their needs will be best served by submitting to the PRI.-1This point was clarified in one of President Mateos’ falksc
when he stated, "The minority as well as the majority has a
right to its opinion, to discussion and to vote; but only
the majority has the right to d e c i d e . "2

The party often

seeks to absorb the opposition at the lower levels where
A

disputes are local and can be resolved before discontent
spreads or at the higher levels the opposition is given re
sponsibility, resoonsabilizar. rather than excluded.3
Although opposition parties have a legal: right;to
exist and can, with the approval of the Secretaria de
Gobernaclon, register as a national party, they

have not

to date presented any serious challenge to the PRI.

Gen

erally, the PRI has been successful in absorbing or

neu

tralizing such opposition parties.

For example, in the 1964

presidential election, two out of the three legally recog-'
nized opposition parties supported the PRI presidential can
didate.
The parties which were registered in the 1964 election,
besides the PRI, were the Partido de AcciSn Nacional (PAN),
"^"Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma Of Mexico *s Development:
The Role of the Private and Public Sectors (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963), 14.
2
■Botsford, loc. cit.
3 Ibid.

-71the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana (PARM), and
"the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS).
The Partido de Acci^n Nacional, a conservative, rightist
party, is the strongest opposition to the PRI.

Since its

formation in 1939, the PAM has held the second highest
sition in elections.

po

Large industrialists, businessmen, and

pro-clerical elements comprise its membership.

It has sup

ported the Church in its campaign'against communism.

.If in

power, the PAM would rescind the anti-clerical provisions of
the Constitution of 1917, favor private foreign capital over
public foreign capital, and would replace the eiido, which
it regards as inefficient, with large scale privately owned
units.
In the 1958 elections, the PAN blamed the PRI for every
conceivable ill and campaigned with vigor, but took an
extremely pious Catholic stand which repelled many conserva
tives-.

This, plus the factor that many businessmen who were

normally inclined to vote for PAN voted for the PRI, caused
the PAN to lose much of its

conservative support and made it

clear that it could not secure power.

(it was noted that in

this 1958 elections businessmen, in many cases, voted for the
PRI.

Two reasons were attributed to this change: (1) the PRI

had taken a rightward swing which attracted the interests of

^“Mexico," Hispanic American .Report, XVII, No. 9
(November, 1964), 691.

-72the conservatives and, (2) many men who had been revolu
tionaries and PRI supporters were now in influential po>
sitions in the business community.
In the 1964 presidential campaigns, the PAN existed
as the only legally active opposition to the PRI.

The

PAN's presidential candidate, Jose Gonzalez Torres, did not
make criticisms of the economic and political nature of the
PRI regime but confined himself to broader themes such as
anti-communism and a "fuller democracy.
However,in the 1964 elections the PRI candidate, D/az
Ordaz was identified as a moderate, conservative and an anti
communist and again the PRI cut into the votes of the PAN for
many conservatives, for the first time, cast their votes for
a PRI candidate when they supported Diaz Ordaz.

The nomi

nation of Ordaz plus such party inclinations towards the
right as handing Mexico’s shipyard over to private business,
refusing to let the telephone workers strike, deporting
foreign leftists, suppression of domestic communism, estrange
ment from Cuba and close economic and diplomatic relations
with the United States seemed to indicate that the‘Mexicpn
political pendulum was swinging toward the right.

Indicative

■^Taylor, ojg. cit., pp. 741-742.
2
"Mexico,*1 Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 4
(June, 1964), 302.
3
Graham, ojo. cit. , pp. 103-107.

-73of the conservative leanings of Ordaz were the events of
April 1965 when communist demonstrations in protest of the
United States’ policy toward Vietnam were broken up by the
government.

Following this, the Mexican Communist Party

headquarters, and two other leftist organizations, the ! ... 'i
Popular Electoral Front, and the Independent Campesino
Central’s offices, were raided.^
The 1964 election saw the rise of extra-legal rightist
parties.

The militant, reactionary, conservative groups the

Frente Patriota de Mexico and the Uni<jn Nacional Sinarquista
appeared, but gained little strength except in the states of
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Queretaro, Puebla and San
Luis Potosi.

Two new Christian Democratic parties appeared

but were injured by an ideological split.
Partido Democratico Cristiano

The rightist

requested annulment of the

anticlerical parts of the 1917 Constitution and demanded that
parents be allowed to educate their children as they wanted,
the more liberal of the two parties, the Movimiento Social
Derm/crata Cristiano. really a pressure group rather than a
party, rejected capitalism and communism, believing that they
were materialistic, and called for society to organize along
the line of Christian precepts.2
^New York Times. April 15, 1965, p. 16.
p

"Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No.
(October, 1964), 691.
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-74The FARM was created in 1954 by members of the PRI who
were discontented with the policies of Aleman and Ruiz
Cortines.

This group, claiming to be supporting the true

revolutionary ideals, has been ineffective by making little
effort to organize, to strengthen its bargaining position or
to enlarge its membership, and has become slightly more than
an arm of the PRI.

Although the PARM sponsored some congres

sional candidates; it supported olaz Ordaz candidacy by
casting 43,685 votes for him.-*The PPS was formed in 1947 when communist labor leader
Vicente Lombardo Toledano broke from the PRI.
been a leftist orientated party.

The PPS has

It originally was comprised

of a coalition of liberals, socialists, and communists.

In

the 1952 election with Toledano as its presidential candidate
it made a notable showing, but since that time it has dwin
dled.

Intraparty friction among its coalition, and in, par

ticular the argument between straight^Hne-communists', who
wished to turn the PPS into an- orthodox communist party and
the moderate communists, such as Toledano who wanted to keep
it more general, have caused the PPS to remain in a weak
position.^

in 1958 the PPS backed Lopez Mateos as its choice

for president and in 1964 Toledano told his members not to

^Ibid., p.
2

688.

Scott, op. cit.. pp. 189-192.
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worry since "all will be well if we support Diaz Ordaz."
It seems as though the PPS is a "fellow traveler with
PRI as well as with the Communists."

1

the

To repay the PPS, the

PRI rewarded it with patronage and direct subsidies.^
Although the PPS did not receive the necessary 2.5 per
cent of votes cast to gain seats under the new electoral
code, leftists deputies helped it and the PARM to obtain
congressional seats, ten for the PPS and five for the PARM.
The PAN was granted twenty seats.

The importance of these

congressional seats was not in the political opportunity or
access they presented to the opposition parties, but rather,
they served as honorary bestowals and a mark of prestige.4
In the eyes of the PRI, they were a token of acknowledgement
for the sake

of preserving power in its quest for unanimity.

In an attempt to emphasize the unity of the nation
and the reconciliation of the loyal opposition into the
Revolutionary fold, the arrangements for the presenV
tation of the speech were such that every group to ac
company the President was composed of leaders from the
Partido Popular Socialists (PPS) Partido Acci6n Nacional5
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8
(October, 1964), 687.
^Martin C. Needier, "Changing the Guard in Mexico,"
Current History XLVIII. No. 281 {January, 1965), 28.
3Ibld.
4
"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII,, No. 8
(October, 1964), 687.
5

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVII, No. 9
(November, 1964), 782.

-76(PAN), and the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion
Mexicana (PARM), as well as newly elected represen
tatives from the official Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI).
At this same tifae President Diaz Ordaz physically

l

j A.

embraced Vicente Lombardo Toledano, head of the PPS and
newly elected Deputy.

Such a gesture could be viewed that

the regime of Diaz Ordaz would strive to maintain good
relations with the moderate left.

Indications from the

last few months of Mateos’ administration suggested this.2
President Mateos’ loose interpretation of the electoral
reforms, his release from prisons of communist artist.
David Alfaro Siqueiros ■, and his decision to vote against
the recommendation of the OAS conference and continue dip
lomatic relations with Cuba seemed to be eoncilatory

meas-

e

ures towards the moderate left.3
Extra-legal leftist parties presented themselves in
the 1964 elections.

These parties, not being approved by

the Secretaria de Gobernaci6n. can pot appear on the ballot,
but do run write-in candidates.

The Frente Electoral del

Pueblo (FEP) and its peasant associate, the Central Campesino
Independiente (CCI), the most aggressive and extreme of
leftist intellectuals.

1Ib id .
2Ib id .
3Ib id .

The Communist Party of Mexico (PCM)

-77remained small with about 5,600 members and stayed aloof
from local and national elections.

Disturbances arose in

the party between the Moscow elements and the militant
element represented by two groups, the Trotskyists and the
followers of the Chinese Communist line.

The PCM realized

that if it did not repress its militant sectors, it may well
be strongly suppressed by the anti-communist Diaz Ordaz.
The preceding factors seem to confirm the belief that one of
the lessons of the 1964 campaign was that the far left con
tinues to be weakened by its division over tactical questions
and by progressivism of government policies, and remains of
small numerical significance.2
It appears that the official party, the PRI, is main
taining its middle of the road position, vacillating between
the left and the right, yet at all times repfelling extremist
movements of either side.

The legally recognized opposition

parties of the 1964 elections were of a moderate nature and
the PRI’s amending the electoral laws so they could obtain
seats in Congress could be interpreted that the PRI's goal
is to incorporate all interests of Mexican society, even if
they may be the opposing parties.3
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8
(October, 1964), 691.

2

Needier, "Changing the Guard in Mexico,", p. 28.

3Ibid.
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One of the major groups that exists outside the ranks
of the official party is the Roman Catholic Church.

It is

forbidden by the Constitution of 1917 to participate legally
in politics, but in recent years, it has been regaining much
of its pre-revolution prestige and has voiced its opinion on
matters.

This rejuvenation can be attributed to several

factors.

Mexico’s people are 97 per cent Catholic and have

a built-in prejudice for, not against, the Church.

Several

of Mexico’s recent presidents have publically announced that
they are believers.

The Church has used its new freedom

to agitate against communism and Castro and has served as
a brake against the government’s leftist orientation.
However, the greatest percentage of Catholics realize
that the temporal power of the Church is secondary to that
of the party.

And the majority of the populace, even if a

prelate advocated the joining of an opposition party, would
not leave the PRI for:
The bulk of the population knows that an ©position
party , in power, may give them nothing, while the PRInominated government has given much in the form of
material benefits.-’The government, although having the material advantage
is, nevertheless, aware of the influence of the Church and
has made concessions to pacify this main institutional
terest group of Mexican society.

in

In 1961, when it appeared

that the Mexican government was unduly sympathetic with the
-*-Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 291.
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Left and Castro, the Church staged a series of demonstrations;
this and other factors led to the Mexican government’s issu
ance of the statement of incompatibility, which states that \
the communist doctrine is not compatible with the democratic
ideology of Latin American states.

Shortly after, a number

of intellectual communist agitators were arrested, and as
previously mentioned , there was a general campaign against
the leftist extremes in Mexico.

In June of 1965, the gov

ernment arrested communist student demonstrators who were
actively campaigning against the Church in anti-Catholic out
bursts in Puebla.

Police were posted at all Puebla Catholic

schools to thwart any reprisal action by university students
against the Church.-1- The government has also attempted to
gain Church support by a loose interpretation of the anti
clerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917.

Clergy are

allowed to appear in clerical dressparochial schools can be
maintained, and seminaries are permittted.
The role of the military has been reduced to the degree
that it is no longer a major institutional interest group.
Mexico has been able to rid itself of the plague
of militarism. A quarter-eentiury ago no Latin American
army was more political than the Mexican; today the
armed forces are virtually out of p o l i t i c s . 2
^The Register. July 9, 1965, p. 1.
2
Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 101.
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The military, coming from a public education and most
often a middle class or lower class environment generally
sympathizes with the PRI.

It is observed that the current

military wins its battles through legislation*'1' Six members
of the military are active in the Chamber of Deputies; five
are members of the Popular Sector and the other belongs to
the Farm Sector.

Ten senators, members of the Popular Sector,

are military members*

The chances of a military revolt are

unlikely, since the career attitude of the officers, the
troops’ reservist nature, and the abolition of the practice
of generals taking their troops with them upon transfer
leave little opportunity for a revolt*2

It can be noted that

after the military sector was dropped from the PRI in 1943,
most of its members affiliated with the Popular Sector, and
have been incorporated into the PRI.
Although the party-government has been limited by its
pledge to agrarianism, it has nevertheless sought in some
measure to pacify the large landholders.

The government*

realizing that large scale and increased production of
agricultural products is necessary for feeding the ever in
creasing population, has urged large-landholders to resume
their large scale production.

Tax concessions, credit and

other incentives have encouraged owners to. cultivate their
^Brandenburg>^op. eft*. p. 295.
2Ibid.. p. 295-296.

-81lands for the first time since the Cardenas administration,
The newspapers of Mexico remain free and independent.
Even though the government controls

the allocation of news-

print, publishers feel they enjoy freedom of press and have

i

not complained about the quantity of newsprint they have
received.

Extreme elements to the left and right are allowed

to publish their own literature which often criticizes the
government.

And even conservative papers such as Mexico f j...

City’s large daily El Excelsior publish editorials which
criticize the government.

The government controls news

papers only in the indirect sense that is is the foremost
advertiser and has the financial ability frequently to buy
large scale advertisements which promote government policies.^
The business and industrial groups exist outside the
PRI structure.

Urbanization, industrialization, population

concentration, specialization, technology, specialized in
terests, accelerated developments in foreign commerce, and an
optimistic attitude toward investment in Mexican economy have
contributed to the rise and importance of trade associations
in Mexico.

Laws of 1936 and 1941 made it obligatory for

industry and chambers of commerce to form into clmaras.3
1Ibld.. p. 303
% b i d . . p . 304.
3

Frank. R. Braddenburg,’’Organized Business In Mexico,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs. XII (Winter,1958), pp. 29-30.
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These camaras (federations)

make it possible for the

government ministries to deal with business collectively and
affords government the opportunity to consult and learn the
attitudes of business before legislation is introduced.-*•
There are two main chambers, the Confederation of
Industrial Chambers of Mexico (COCAUIIN), and the Confederation
of National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANCO).
The purpose of these chambers, according to law,
is to resolve the special problems concerning business
interests, to encourage the development of business in
general and the several branches thereof in particular,
and to institutionalize the inter-relations of business
and government.2
The CONCAMIN

was founded in 1917 and put under govern

ment control by Cardenas in 1937.

The CONCAMIN aggregates

the interest of its fifty-one chambers.

The collective

weight of these chambers represents virtually all major
Mexican industry.

The government consults CONCAMIN for the

view of private industry on legislation, administrative regu
lations , and on state operated industries.3

By tax

exemptions, a protectionist tariff, direct import control,
credit, and subsidies the government has sought to aid
■^Brandenburg, ‘'Mexico: Experiment in One Party
Democracy," , p. 298.
^Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico,",
pp. 29-30.
^Ibid.

-83industry in Mexico.'*'

The CONCANACO, the Mexican Chamber of

Commerce, has two hundred and fifty-four chambers.

Besides

conferring with the government, it articulates its interests
through conferences on taxation, tariffs, and price controls.2
In addition to the CONCAMIN and the CONCANACO, there are
private national trade and commercial groups.

These groups

seek access to government and articulate their interests
through the presidential offices and commissions.

Some of

the more important are : the Bankers Association, the Mexican
Association of Insurance, trade groups of mixed nationalities,
specialized trade associations, small business interests and
fraternal groups of business.3
It must be noted, however, that within the business
groups of Mexico there is a distinct division between the
old industrialists and the new group.
The old group is divided into three factions;

(l) those

who were important economic groups in Mexico before World
War II, (2) those industrial groups which are connected with
American capital, and (3) those small, local, handicraft
industries.

These older manufacturing firms find alliances

in the larger business community of the leading commercial
institutions and banks of Mexico.

The old group welcomes

■'"Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 195077 PP» 29-30.
2
Brandenburg, ''Organized Business in Mexico,", p. 38.
^Ibid.. p. 42.

-84governraent intervention in measures such as tariffs but
objects to comprehensive action by government in economics.,
It fears that government might take over private business
interests and thus opposes a working alliance between gov
ernment and business.-*The new group, comprised of small manufacturing plant
owners, came into existence during World War II.

This group

of nationalistic industrialists stepped in to fill the void
of imports of consumer goods.

The new group relies upon its

own initiative for technical direction and uses Mexican
capital for investment.

It claims Mexico for the Mexicans

and anticipates the time when Mexico is self-sufficient in
the production of consumer goods.

It has sought to mobilize

Mexicans in the process of modernization by supplying them
with the techniques of modernization, new wants and pur
chasing ability.2
The new group looks to the government for tariff, import
and export protections.

It believes that the industrialists

and the government , with the cooperation of labor, should
work together on a program for the industrialization
Mexico.

of

It visualizes continuous contact ajnd cooperation

between government agencies and industrial groups and be
lieves

the mechanism for this program is the camaras de
'*'Mosk, op. cit., pp. 24-30.
2
Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 335.

-85industria. -"The point of view of the New Group can probably
best be summed up by saying that they consider the government
to be a necessary ally for the growing industries of Mexico,".
Business in general support the status quo and "Mexican
business prefers a stable nation and , accordingly, at least
passively supports the PRI and actively supports the

gov

ernment.
It is noted that the PRI has sought to absorb and
adjust outside opposition parties, and interests.

The

balancing of diverse interests has been particularly evident
in Mexican economics.
PRI and Mexican Economics
From 1940, the balanced approach has taken root in
Mexican economics.

Since that time, the middle class as

guardians of the Revolution have related the progression of
Revolutionary ideals to industrialism; they have placed
emphasis on Mexico's industrialization to the extent that
industry and agriculture have formed a partnership.^
"Fields, as well as factories, form part of the industri
alizing,. process, as Mexican policy-makers see it."4
u. ■ .. . .o

farms must provide the needed domestic market for goods;
%osk, op. cit.. pp. 29-30
O

Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party
Democracy,", p. 300.
3
Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 232.
4 Ibid..

p. 233.

-86they must raise raw materials for the factories, and they
must exist to feed the nation.

In turn, industry helps the

agrarian element by purchasing their products, by providing
work for the displaced rural workers, and by producing modern
manufactured goods that will aid in the modernization of
rural areas.^
Another co-partnership exists between government and
business.
cooperate.

Government and business do not compete, but rather
Government has the primary responsibility for

setting the economic stage and business supplements it.
Government does not plan industrialization, but
makes it possible by other developmental functions;
communications, irrigation, electrification,
priorities of tax exemptions for needed industries
(to attract private investment), flexible and
sympathetic tariff policies. Government and business
are partners, sharing the common goal of increased
production and productivity.2
Lopez Mateos confirmed this view in a speech before
the Confederaci^n de Camaras Industriales in which he
pointed out ‘
that multifarious fields were open to invest
ment and urged

private business to increase their invest

ments; the activities of the public sector and the private
sector

should be complementary and not competitive.3

Government plays an important part in Mexican economy.
It has almost absolute control over the establishment of
^Ibid.
2Ibid.
3

"Mexico,” Hispanic American Review, XV, No. 3
(May, 1962), 206.
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tariffs, fixation of import controls, money supply, subsidies,
exemptions from taxes, and labor legislation.

Besides

directing the private sector, it has, through its public
sector, acquired control of the largest fronts of credits,
either by direct ownership or by owning the most shares in
semi-autonomous agencies.

Heavy government control is seen

in industries that are basic to the economy, such as rail
roads, hydroelectric projects, petroleum, steel mills, air
lines, and the manufacturing of automobiles.

The technical

and financial support has been channeled through the gov
ernment’s chief development corporation, National Financiers.
National Financiers became important in 1941 when it began
to sponsor projects to replace wartime shortages in indus^
tries such as iron, steel, caustic soda, rayon, yarn, and
pulp.

During the years 1946 to 1948, it became engaged in
’

f

.

projects in iron, steel, textiles, pulp, and paper, cement,
electric and chemical industries.

But in 1950 its primary

attention was upon the promotion of new industries; trans
portation and communications, electrical power and consoli
dation of established industries.

National Financiera has

sought to concentrate in areas where lack of capital has
existed and has, thus, alleviated shortages which would have
hampered the further development of industry.1

An example

^The Combined Mexican Working Party, The Economic
Development of Mexico. A Report to the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (Baltimore; The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1953), pp. 78-79.

c

-

88
i

of National Financiers'$ aid can be seen in the sugar
industry.

After the war, when sugar imports were absorbing

progressing amounts of foreign exchange, National Financiera
invested heavily to add to the Mexican sugar industry's
capacity.I

National Financiera's importance has increased

for it is the only agency authorized for negotiating foreign
loans, principally from the United States Export-Import
Bank and the World Bank.2

National Financiera approaches

its duties, in a flexible manner.
cern to make it pay.

It may revamp a weak cor^e :

It may begin with a new project

bringing together Mexican entrepreneurs, and foreign invest
ment,

Or it may use the approach of "mixed" companies in

which Mexican capital, foreign capital and the government

National Financiera advocates "free enterprise."
its project becomes stable, it divests itself of its

Once
in

terests by selling it,s stock, replacing it with bonds or
having arprivatei.thlrfJaparty gain an interest in the business.
Mexico,, because of its economic planning and direction,
has experienced a steady climb upward in its economic system.
^Ibid.
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 343.
3Ibid., pp. 342-344.

-89Cline notes this in the following quote:
The imposing arrays of figures now pouring forth
strengthen the inescapable conclusions that an economic
revolution of major magnitude has been taking place for
a decade and still is in full motion. . . . The salient
fact is that the upward sweep of production curves,
graphs of increased participation, carloadings, and all
the other paraphernalia entailed in economic analysis
add up to a slowly rising standard of living for the
Mexican nation which even inflation.and its own in*: ^
creasing numbers have not reversed.
Since Mexico began to stress economic progress, it has
achieved notable growth.

Although private initiative played

an important part, the unprecedented economic growth of
Mexico between 1939 and 1950 was largely because of the poli
cies and investment of the Federal Government.2
The 1960’s saw continued progress for Mexico.

In 1962,

Lopez Mateos set forth a three-year plan of economic develop
ment.

This plan, requiring close cooperation between the

government and private capital, sought, among other things,
to accelerate the growth rate of the Gross National Product
3
from 3.5 per cent (1961) to 6 per cent in 1962.
Many felt
that this was too optimistic a goal.

However, the next few

years saw a substantial increase in Gross National Product,
a six per cent increase in 1963 and a seven per cent increase
in real terms for 1964.

The year 1964 also saw capita income

^Ibid.. p. 333.
2
The Combined Mexican Working Party, op., cit., p. 148.
3

’’Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 5
(May, 1962), 399.

-90rise 3 per cent.l
The year 1964 was viewed as unusual, for even though
it was a presidential election year the expected
fall did not take place.

2

economic

The economic rhythm did not be

come slower but increased.

Investors did not wait to know

the composition of the new cabinet but invested immediately.
One observer remarked that this trend seemed to be "a bath
in the Sea of E u p h o r i a . The key word in evaluating the
year of 1964 was confidence.4
Five reasons were attributed for the unprecedented
election-year growth.

The first reason was that President

Lopez Mateos announced he would use government funds, if
needed, to aid increased production.

The second reason was

that the administration carried out fiscal reforms,
ularly in the tax structure.

partic

In 1958, there were 700,000

taxpayers in Mexico , but the 1964 fiscal reforms increased
this number to 4.5 million.

Tax collections were expected to

reach 1.5,954 million pesos, an increase of 2,150 million
pesos over 1963*s total.

It was thought that Mexico would

^New York Times. January 22, 1965, p. 53.
2
This economic fall is not caused from uncertanity
as to whom the new president will be, for he is always the
PRI candidate, but rather because of the uncertanity as to
what the new president's economic policies might be.
3

Ibid., p. 54.

4 Ibid.

-91impose a personal income tax in the near future and there
were indications that a progressive rate would end Mexico’s
standing as a low-tax country for residents.^

Tax reforms

effective in 1965 provided for the inclusion of the decen
tralized agencies and government-owned enterprises.2
The general confidence in Mexican economy was the third
reason for the economic growth of 1964.

In that year, 1.4

million shares of stock were traded on the Mexico City
stock exchange in the first four months.

In 1963, a total

of 1.6 million shares were sold for the entire year.

In

certain areas, high production resulted in job creation and
the fostering of local business confidence.

Mexico’s National

Mining Association finished planning the $75 million project
which would convert San Luis Potosi into an immense indus
trial and mining complex.

One of the most outstanding

ex

amples of confidence was the private Mexican firm, Mexican
Longoria Enterprises, buying out a major United States com
pany which was operating in Mexico.3
The fourth reason for the economic prosperity was that ,
owing to higher purchasing power caused by an increase in
minimum wages and the profit-sharing law, consumers had more
■'■’’Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 595.
2New York Times. January 22, 1965, p. 53.
,
-T - - 3 -T-•/
"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 595.

-92money to spend than before.

Under the profit-sharing law

employees who originally expected to receive $40 million
now expected to receive double that amount. -1 The govern
ment has taken particular note of this need for an increase
in the consumer market.

The president of the CEC, Corona de

Roral, held that the government by its nationalization of
minerals, railroads, petroleum, and electrical power had
proved the PRI idea of "economic growth with social justice"
by increasing the masses purchasing p'ower.

2

The record of foreign loans, on the whole self-liqui
dating, provided the fifth reason for the optimistic economic
picture.

Private foreign investors invested around $1,500

million in Mexico in 1963.

The United States!share-eomppised-

about $1,300 million of this.

Many foreign firms sought

Mexican companies which were willing to take in foreign capi
tal.3

in addition to private foreign capital investment,

there has been a noticeable increase in private investment by
domestic firms.
The climate of confidence which prevails in Mexico1,
its political stability, the monetary and credit meas
ures and government expenditure on infrastructural 4

o

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 3
(May,.I960), 206.
3
"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 596.
n
4

New York Times. January 22, 1965., p. 53.
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programs have promoted a substantial'.increase in private
investment and a greater flow of external savings, both
private and public.^
Private investment represented 54.2 per cent of total
investment in 1963 and continued at a high level in 1964
placing emphasis in construction industry, cement, chemicals,
steel, automobiles and machinery.2
The government has placed great importance upon the
establishment of a firm basis for the development of a public
works program.

In 1962, it issued a directive to all depart

ment and government ministries requesting that they draw a
national plan which would coordinate their actions.

The gov

ernors of the states were also made aware of the new impetus
in public planning and have joined in developing plans for
industrialization, transportation, irrigation, and electrifi
cation.

And in public works planning, the government has

embarked upon a project to incorporate more of Mexico’s
population into the process and profits of modernization by
spreading new industries throughout Mexico rather than con
centrating them around the big cities.

The government has

also composed a list of 600 industrial products which it has
urged private industry to manufacture, for it feels that
these listed products are essential to further development.^
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3

■"
Elsworth L. Stinyard, “Getting the Facts in Mexico,"
Mexican American Review. (January, 1962), 29.
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Government shares in the general economic confidence.
In 1964 its budget was 15 per cent higher than that of 1963
and the 1965 Federal budget totaled $1,428.3 million which
was an increase of 11.9 per cent over 1964.

It appears as

if Mexican economy is expanding and the general feeling Is
that of confidence for the future.
:

PRI Stability

The preceding pages that dealt with the stability of
the PRI seemed to conclude that the PRI is resting upon a
firm base.

They predict a bright future for the Mexican

one party system and support the leaders.* confidence in its
continuance.
The PRI, by its own political machinery, can extend to
the whole of Mexican society.

Through its committee struc

ture at the national, state, and local levels, and its sector
organizations, the PRI is able to feel the pulse..of ■the pppulace and provide them with an institutionalized structure
through which they can participate in realizing their polit
ical, economic, and social objectives.

Yet it must be noted

that the centralized nature of this machinery also enables
the party to maintain a firm control in the chain of command.
The party's identification with the government offers a
second means through vwhich it can communicate with and
direct society.

By, its control of the executive, administra

tive, legislative, and judicial branches at all levels
^Mew York Tiroes, op. cit.. p. 53.

of

-95government, it is able to set the guide-lines of Mexican
development and again exist as the main channel through which
Mexican citizens strive to obtain their goals.
By its identification as the "official party" and the
party of the Revolution, the PRI has become hallowed to the
extent that a vote against the PRI is unpatriotic, for it is
a vote against the ideals and goals of the Mexican Nation.
The party, since its formation in 1929, has maintained
itself in an unchallengeable! position.

It has not only

represented a majority, but a staggering majority.

The PRI

has beep successful in organizing the main interests of farm,
labor, and the middle class into its sector organizations and
it has most often succeeded in incorporating major outside
interests such as business groups and the Church, and even
opposition parties into its deliberating process.

It presents

the idea that it is only within this majority ‘that an interest
group can succeed.

This preceding idea seems analagous to the

United States’ two party system.
third

Over a period of years no

party in the United States has been able to poll any

sufficient amount of votes. The voters want to be on the side
!
of the winner and it is evident that third parties have little
chance of being the winner against the power of the estabr
lished majority.

And so it is in Mexico, for the opposition

parties have little chance in being a winner against the
established majority, the PRI, which has through the years
increased its position of power in its attempt to establish
stability and continuity.

CHAPTER
PRI

AND

V

INSTABILITY

PRI1s Identification with the Government
Although arguments have been extended as to the stability
of the Mexican one-party system, elements of instability do
exist and will be considered in this chapter.
The argument has been advanced that governmental and
party control are being weakened by the decentralization of
the governmental process.

Decentralization can be especially

noted in the role of the executive, because the president can
no longer govern in detail but must allocate responsibility to
other officials, for the demands of society, actuated by
industrialization, have multiplied and require more
cialized knowledge.

spe

Truly competent administrators are dif

ficult to find, and, once appointed, their removal is unlikely.

..

Thus these administrators, and also many elected of

ficials, becoming more independent and acquiring broader areas
of discretion, are forming political machines which could
pose a potential threat to the party's control.
"^Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System: A Re-evaluation,"
pp. 998-999.
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-97Dissatisfaction with government officials has been
voiced by Mexicans.

Because of the synonymous nature of

the government and the' party, the citizens’ displeasure is
a reflection on the PRI.
It has been noted that party members hold most gov
ernment positions and that often leaders of the various
sectors have prominent positions in the government depart
ment which corresponds to their sector.
been termed polyfunctionalism.

This process has

Such polyfunctionalism

often causes the leaders to lose loyalty to the organi
zation which originally placed them in power and to use
their new position to acquire personal gain.
particularly apparent in the Labor Sector.

This has been
Union leaders

have often lost view of the interests of their organization
and have become tools of the government.

The strikes of 1958

and 1959 may have shown dissatisfaction with the PRI con
trolled leadership.
The demands of the rank-and-file developed out of
grievances which sprang from the realization that the
party-union relationship has changed from union sup
port of the party to party domination of the unions,
by means of venal leaders. For years it has been so
obvious that men become leaders of lah?or for personal
profit and political power that it has been remarked
openly throughout the country.
^"Taylor, o£. cit., pp. 738-739.

-98The party seems to be confronted by the fact that many
members place self-interest above the collectivity.

Frank

Tannenbaum observes that "the decline in the personal integ:rity so essential to the new responsibilities thrown upon
both government and private enterprise . . .

is the greatest

single moral failure of the Mexican Revolution.
A common saying in Mexico has been that corruption and
bribery (mordida) have oiled the gears of the party.

During

the mid-twenties to the mid-forties, the three sectors were
saturated with corruption.

For example, labor circulated

lists with the names of the labor officials and the sums
expected by the officials if they were to settle a dispute.2
Graft and corruption also played a part in the period from
1946 to 1952, the time of President Miguel Alemln.
The Alemln administration was noted for its
grandiose economic activities. . . . It also
became noted later by word of mouth and in the
Mexico City newspapers for the corruption ac
companying all of these projects, and for the
very profitable economic strangleholds reputedly
held by such men as Jorge Pasquel, with his oil
distribution monopoly in the capital, . . . or
Antonio Daaz Lombardo, who made a fortune in trans
port and by milking the Social Security Department.

Bread

Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 80.
2

Needier, "The Political Development of Mexico", p. 310.

^Scott, op. cit.. p. 250.

-99Government agrarian institutions, the Banco Aqrario, the
Banco E.jidal. and the Departamento de Asuntos Aqrarios y
ColonizacLtfh

(DAAC) have allegedly been involved in cor

ruption concerning the handling of financial grants to the
e.jidos

and have been accused of unjust dealings in the

distribution of land to the peasants.

Often corrupt,minor

politicians have held positions of authority in the agrarian
institutions and have allowed large landholders to keep land
which should be distributed to peasants.

An illustrative

example of such corruption could be seen in the case
involving the DAAC and the peasants of Toluca, Mexico.

In

Toluca, lands had been granted the peasants since 1940, but
a close friendship that existed between DAAC officials and
the ownerso of the latifundios
of property.

prevented the actual transfer

Since 1940, the Supreme Court has handed down

decisions which favored the new e.iidatarios . but threats of
armed force by the DAAC dissuaded the peasants
over their land.

from taking

Finally, in April, 1964, some peasants

took possession of the Toluca land against the force of the
DAAC.1
Corruption has caused men to lose faith in the idea of
the Revolution.

Generals Barragan and Tevino, in 1954,

dismayed with the loss of revolutionary honor and zeal,
1 "Mexico,11 Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 496.

-1 0 0 particularly during the corrupt Aleman administration, broke
from the PEI and formed the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion
Mexicana (FARM), the party which claims to represent the true
revolutionary goals.
PRI and the Revolution
Other Mexicans, such as Emilo Portes Gil, David
Siqueiros, and Marcantonio Diaz Infante, maintain that the
party has neglected, betrayed and altered the goals of the
Revolution for its own pragmatic approach.
Many maintain that the agrarian reform program, one
of the main principles of the Revolution, has been plagued
by graft and deception.

Emilo Portes Gil, for example, notes

that the benefits of the Revolution are not being distributed
effectively throughout the entire population, and that thirty
million live in misery while five million are p r i v i l e g e d . 2
The charge of violating the 1917 Constitution was also
levied by David Siqueiros.

He was arrested in March, 1962

under the Law of Social D i s s o l u t i o n . ^

During his trial, he

condemned the government’s violation of the 1917 Constitution
in regard to the division of power.

He warned that the

^Scott, ojg. cit. , p. 187.
2
"Bright Spot In The, Hemisphere," U.S. News and
World Report, LVI, No. 8 (February 24, 1964), 96-97.
3
This law, passed in 1941, intended to apply to
those persons obstructing government1s aims, is vague and
has often been interpreted by the State to apply to persons
expressing disagreement with the regime's policies.

-1 0 1 judiciary and legislative branches were controlled by the
executive and warned that the future of democracy of Mexico
was endangered by the development of an autocratic type of
government.^
On April 17, 1962, the Zapata Movement, led by
Marcantonio Diaz Infante, petitioned the U.N. General
Assembly and the Security Council for diplomatic recognition
as the government of Mexico and for free elections within the
next six months under U.N. supervision.

Among the charges

against the government were that it had continually withheld
the freedoms expressed in the Constitution of 1917 and that
it had deprived the Mexican people of effective suffrage, one
of the original goals of the Revolution.2
Since the PRI can and does change the definition of the
revolutionary goals, the Revolution has come to be what the
regime says it is.

An example of this can be seen in the

PRI’s identification of industrialization with the Revolution,
for originally industrialization was not mentioned in the
revolutionary objectives or in the Constitution of 1917.

It

could even be argued that the revolutionaries were fighting
"'’•'Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 3
(May, 1962), 205.

2

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 4
(June, 1962), 302.
3
Taylor, op. cit.. p. 731.
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against the over-emphasis that Poxfirio D^az had placed upon
industrialism and his neglect of agrarianism.

It is para

doxical to note that now the pendulum seems to be swinging
again toward industrialism and away from agrarianism.
Vernon mentions that although the president receives
great majorities, his position is unsteady for there is no
one revolutionary ideology that binds the many splinters
together.^

It was stated that "the universal allegiance

of the leaders of the PRI to the Revolution has only
slightly more substance than the asserted allegiance of
2
the United States politician to the Founding Fathers."
Even though general goals such as equitable distribution
of land and decent labor conditions are connected with
the Revolution, wide areas are left to the manner, methods
and timing for the fulfillment of the goals, for the
interests of the PRI encompass little short of the 180
degree span of opinion which typifies European parliamentary
structure. 3

it is further noted that all of these splinters

deserve some measure of access and accommodation'if the<dissension within the party is to be kept within tolerable
limits.

This question of whether the PRI can continue

to

represent the interests that are emerging in the pluralistic
■^Vernon, op,, pit., p. 13.
2

Ibid.. p. 14.

3Ibid.

-103society is paramount in the consideration of the party’s
continuance.
PRI and the Pluralistic Society
Isaac Deutscher, in his discussion of the Russian oneparty system, foresees the collapse of the monolithic party
structure of Russia.

He argues that the rising working

class possesses a potential political power.

He states

that it has only been since the 1950’s that the working
class has been consolidated as a "modern social force,
acquiring an urban industrial tradition, becoming aware
of itself, and gaining c o n f i d e n c e . S i n c e this time,
the working class has sought a new egalitarianism.

Here

tofore, they had found themselves only .nominally equal
since in their actual position they were subsidiary to
the ruling groups, the intellectuals, the managerial
class and the government bureaucrats.

Even today, he sees

the working class as being semiarticulate and limited to
fragmentary and scattered manifestations.

However, the

workers’ present and potential power is being noticed, and
the government has tried to pacify them with reform
legisl a t i o n . ^

Nevertheless, the working class continues

to emerge as a growing threat to the existing political
^Isaac Deutscher. Russia in Transition (New York:
Grove Press, Inc., I960), p. 56.

2
Ibid., pp. 59-62.

-104system.

V.O. Key also notes that the working class, along

with the effects of urbanization, can lead to the disinte
gration of the one-party system.
Mexican society is experiencing modernization and is
becoming more pluralistic.

As Western economic and social

conditions begin to operate even more effectively in Mexican
culture, interest groups may become more competitive and
complex to the point that the PRI machinery will not be
able to satisfy them.-*If this occurs, it probably will involve multipli
cation of the specialized interests participating
in politics, together with a basic change in nature
of membership in such interest groups, creating
multiple political motivating forces not now present.
Certainly the introduction of education, the expansion
of social sophistication, and the spread of political
awareness have accelerated the weakening of personalistic relationships and the growth of overlapping
memberships in interest groups and associations which
can and do find' themselves in competition on given
public policy issues.2
The question that arises is whether, as the general
level of society rises, will the party be able to rise
with it.

"As professional politicians— and, in the wider

sense, as leaven to

an unpolitical mass--the PRI personnel

are first rate; the question is whether they will be ef
fective as executors and instruments of a parallel government in a modern society."
^Scott, op. cit., p. 31.
2

Ibid.

3

Botsford, op. cit., p. 16.

-105The PHI, as any group which broadens its interests, must
be ready to deal with diverse interests.

The inclusion of

many interests may stimulate dissatisfaction among the
diverse elements, and "the range of interest included may be
come so wide as to cause gratification of the policy proposals
at one terminus of the spectrum to run counter to the aims and
interests of groupings at the other."-*-

There are interests

and pressures in the country that can no longer be denied,
and if they are not placated, it may be possible that their
dissatisfaction could bring about the disintergration of the
current system.

For example, it is observed that at present

there is a great deal of unrest in the labor and agrarian
sectors of the PRI.

This unrest could be regarded as a

rejection of the PRI’s control over the sector organizations.
Interests Inside the PRI
If any single area were to be chosen as the most
unstable spot in the PRI administration, the rural region
would undoubtedly be it.

The agrarian situation currently

t

presents the gravest threat to party stability.

The impor

tance of the agrarian element is obvious; it comprises 50
per cent of the economically active population; a total of
60 per cent of Mexico’s exports come from agriculture; and
"^Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican
One-Party System", p. 270.
^Taylor,

cit. , pp. 735-740.

o

-106internal farm production constitutes almost the sole source
of Mexico's food.

However, less than 22 per cent of the

national income is distributed among the rural population.
The overpopulated, under-employed rural segment exists, as
a whole, in a setting of abject poverty with its rural slums
and hunger for land.

Recently, in 1958, the straits of the

Farm Sector were illustrated with the demonstrations of the
paracaidistas.

The paracaidistas , rural peasants who il

legally migrated and "squatted" upon large tracts of land,
held that these estates (latifundios) were in excess of and
in violation of the maximum land allotment of the agrarian
reform rules.
These paracaidistas'

demonstrations, the hunger

marches, the alleged corruption of government agrarian
institutions, and the uneven distribution of income have
caused the rural sector to emerge explosively as the party's
major problem.
The great unrest within the rural sector has become
progressively noticeable in the past few years.

The PRI

leadership, aware of the seriousness of the demonstrations'
implications, has begun to stress the agrarian sector as a
primary target for social, economic and political reform.
Yet violence still persists.

A few examples from the period

^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 6
(August, 1964), 495.

-107of 1962 to 1965 give an indication of the bitterness and
strife that has taken place between the agrarians and the
government.
In Februrary, 1962, two paracaidistas
took place.

uprisings

The most notable was led by Ruben Jararaillo

who with 3,000 armed peasants occupied 30,000 hectares in
the state of Morelos; they were dislodged by government
troops.^
May, 1962, was a month of instability and violence
that began with the brutal murder of Ruben Jaramillo and
his family.

The nation was incensed with the atrocity,

and the government was implicated in the crime.

Near the

machine-gun riddled bodies of the rural peasant leader and
his family, empty cartridge shells were found that bore the
mark of Fabrics Nacional de Municiones, the government
munitions factory.

Furthermore, Army Captain Jose Martines

was positively identified as the leader of the military group
which kidnapped the Jaramillo family from their home.^

Also

in May, some 15,000 peasants of the state of Coahuila,
seeking an audience with the president, began a hunger march
to Mexico City.

These protestors marched in opposition to

^'Mexico,*' Hispanic American Report, XV, Mo. 5
(July, 1962), 397.
2Ibid.

-108the policy of the government’s La Forestal Company which had
reduced the

price of ixtle, a fiber for coarse rope, and had

refused to pay back debts.

The peasants were on the verge of

starvation because of these two measures.

The government

arbitrator promised a government loan of 20 million pesos
''1

to La Forestal Company so that it could pay all its debts
and raise the price of ixtle 25 per cent.

In the same

month, Jacinto Lopez, leader of the workers and peasants'
Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico, (UGOCM)
threatened to invade large estates unless the administration
moved faster in Resolving the land reform problem.

Lopez,

an experienced leader in such land invasions, had led a
series of land expropriations in the states of Baja
California, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Colima.

The government

warned him that it would not tolerate further demonstrations
and stated that only the president could parcel out lands
and redistribute the large estates.^
The following month 1,200 peasants from southern
Sonora began a hunger march to Mexico City in a demand for
a solution of agrarian problems in the northwestern states
of Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Baja California.

They protested

that the government's agrarian agency Departamento de Asuntos
y Colonizacidn (DAAC) had denied land to more than 100,000

1Ibid., pp. 397-398.

-109peasants, and that irrigation waters had been distributed
unfairly by the government.

The march was allegedly led by
i

the PPS and the UGOCM, both leftist organizations.^
Peasants from the village of El Huanal in the township
of Nautila, Veracruz appeared in July, 1962 before the DAAC
to protest the burning and destruction of their village and
the slaughter of their livestock and pets by state troopers
and police.
latifundio

This onslaught was supposedly provoked by two
owners who sought to intimidate the villagers

from seeking the division of their latifundios under the
agrarian reform laws.^
Land invasions continued and by January, 1963,
5,000 squatters had been dislodged from lands in Durango
and Chihuahua.
was formed.

An Independent Campesino Central (CCI)
The CCI, a leftist organization, issued the

ultimatum to the government to form an acceptable land
program before Hay or face nationwide demonstrations.^
In June, 1964, the CCI instigated demonstrations which
culminated in riots against the presidential candidate,
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 6
(August, 1962), 494.

2

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 7
(September, 1962), 588.
3
New York Times, January 8, 1963, p. 1.
4

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No. 4
(June, 1964), 302-303.

-110Diaz Ordaz, and the land reform program,,

Letters eame from

the states of Oaxaca, Michocan, Veracruz, Puebla, Jalicso,
and Guanajuato to tell of the confusion that existed in the
eiido communities.

These epistles noted the corruption

existing in the management of the Banco Ejidal which was
run by minor politicians who often allowed provincial farmers
to hold land that should have been given to the peasants.^
These rural peasants seemed to have no idological
goals; rather, they were showing their discontent with the
government for its negligence

with regard to the agrarian

society.
This small, hopless,
of their determination to
change.
It was their way
more than promises from a
government.^

revolution was a manifestation,
have social and economic of saying that they now want
one-party ’’democratic*'

That the Farm Sector was being neglected had been
apparent in the past.

Although the CNC is the largest mass

organization in Mexico, the eiiditarios and the small farmers
are by no means a paramount power in Mexico’s political
process.^

In a 1950 chart breaking down the Mexican working

foa?ce into class and income per month, it was related that
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 496.

2

William M. Barbreri , “Is All Progress?" America
LLVI, No. 47 (Februrary 3, 1962), 581.
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

-11185.92 per cent of the lower class Mexican workers received
less than 300 pesos each month while the upper and middle
class workers received between 300 and 1,000 a m o n t h . T h i s
uneven distribution is, perhaps, attributed to the political
ineffectiveness of the agrarian and urban workers and their
leaders who have not represented them properly.^
In 1957, agriculture constituted 53.5 per cent of the
economically active population while industry comprised
16.8 per cent.

Yet in the distribution of income, agricul

ture received 22.9 per cent compared to industry with 34.5
per cent. ^

Even in 1964 with the government’s increased

agrarian program, the agrarian sector,, composing 50 per cent
of the economically active population, received less than
22 per cent of the national inpppie.^
\

The Labor Sector has, according to Scott, received in
comparision to agriculture a higher share of benefits than
its numbers warrant; it has enjoyed a better standard of
living; and has very nearly equated the Farm Sector on
government councils.

However, all has not been harmonious

^A peso at this time was equivalent to 12.5
U.S. Cents.
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
3
Stinyard, op. cit., p. 28.
4

"Mexico, " Hispanic American --Report, XVII, No. 6
(August, 1964), 495.

-112within the Labor Sector.
within the sector.

Two major factions have emerged

The CTM and its supporters, comprising

85 per cent of the Labor Sector's membership make up the
Bloaue de Unidad Obrera (BUO).

The BUO is opposed by

leftist labor groups which are led hy the Confederacion
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC).

Although

this anti-BUO labor element received a great deal of sup
port from the Cortines’ regime, it alienated the govern
ment with the 1958 and 1959 strikes.-*-

Owing to the greater

strength of the CTM and the government crackdown on the
leftist labor unions after the 1959 demonstrations, it does
not seem at present that the left-right factionalism could
lead to the Labor Sector’s disintegration.

But if the anti-

BUO element could gain by recruitment and equalize the BUO
in membership, a crisis could occur.

In the meantime,

however, this internecine struggle has handicapped the Labor
Sector in its position for power.
In reference to the 1958 and 1959 strikes, it was held
that they indicated that the laborer was tired of having to
work for the Revolution with little compensation.
^Scott, 0£. cit., pp. 164-168.
o
Taylor, op. cit., p. 739.

-113"Nationalistic pride, never edible, becomes a bad condiment
when o v e r e m p l o y e d . U n i o n demonstrations voiced the idea
that government of the past few years had been conservative
to the extreme of almost being anti-labor and the strikes
served as warnings for the government to be more generous.
As mentioned previously, the strikes were also interpreted
as a rebellion of the rank and file of labor against their
corrupt and PHI controlled labor leaders.

The rebellious

attitude of the unions was expressed in a union resolution
in 1958 which was passed at a special congress session.

This

resolution held that public office would, in the future, be
incompatible with union office and that the salaries of the
union officers would be r educed.^
Both the labor and agrarian sectors have received
relatively less than the Popular Sector.

Although the

government has sought to aid both withfpublic works programs
and long range plans, the peasants of the agrarian and labor
sectors have not realized it.

To them aid means direct and

immediate rectification of their problems.
Ironically, the present instability that is seen within
the Popular Sector exists because it is receiving too many
benefits.

The FSTSE, the government workers union, receives

"'’Taylor, gjo. cit. , p. 739.
2Ibid.

-114such a high proportion of elective officers and government
support that some observers wonder whether the Popular Sector
can remain intact with one of its ten branches receiving such
extraordinary f a v o r s . T h e question also arises as to
whether the Popular Sector’s ten branches can continue to
envelop the ever-expanding interests of a modern Mexico.

It

is this sector more than any other which must seek to
incorporate the diverse groups of society.
Although some prognosticators forecast party instability
because of the splits and divisions within the sectors,
others believe that the greatest potential threat to party
stability comes from the sectors* having, as independent
units, the strength and the ability to break from the PRI and
form opposition parties.
Can the PRI*s virtual monopoly of Mexican politics
survive? An examination of the alternative party
organizations currently available indicates that there
is no present choice to be made. Yet the sectors
possess the initiative if they wish to exercise it.
Labor, on the one hand, and the peasants and farmers,
on the other, have gained strength . . . as the result
of industrialization and population increase . . . No
longer junior partners, they are the major props of the
party . . . Further, both interest groups, incomplete
though they are at the present time in terms of
composition, are more experienced in the field of
political action than most parallel groups which can
be found in other countries.2
"'‘Scott, op. cit.,
^Taylor,

ojd.

p.

cit. ,

170.

pp.

743-744.

-115PRI and Outside Interests
Threats to party stability are not confined to the
interests within the PRI but are frequently found in groups
which remain outside the party’s official ranks.

Although

leftist-provoked demonstrations occur and new left-wing groups
continue to form,the left does not present a serious threat to
PRI stability.

It is, according to Graham, "orating and

pamphleteering its way to oblivion."1

Karl Schmitt states,

"Today, for the most part the Communists are talking to
themselves, quearreling among themselves, and sometimes
p
voting for themselves."
The rightist orientated groups,
however, being stronger and better organized, constitute a
potentially greater threat to PRI power.

Among the strongest

of the rightist groups is the Church.
The Church persists as a vital institution in Mexico.
Statistics indicate that 97 per cent of the Mexicans claim
to be Catholic and that there are 9 archbishops, 34 bishops,
6,020 priests, 1,990 seminarists, and 18,560 religious
g
sisters.
The potential danger posed by the strength of organized
Catholic groups is indicated by the following datum.

In

^Graham, o£. cit., p. 110.
2
Karl M. Schmitt., "Communism In Mexico Today,"
Western Political Science Quarterly (March, 1963), 112.
3
Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 177.

-116a study of voluntary associations in the city of
Guadalajara, it was found that Mexicans in their parti
cipation in voluntary associations, concentrated their
membership in Church affiliated organizations.

An illustra

tive example was that 81.7 per cent of women!s membership
was centered in Church groups.^"
In 1953, the Mexican Legion of Decency, the Knights
of Columbus, and the Committee for Catholic Action conducted
a campaign on national morality that culminated in an as
sembly in which forty-four Catholic organizations, (twentyfour secular orders, and twenty pious orders) with
4,530,743 members, were represented.

This assembly made

known the following statistics of Catholic membership
2
divisions:

I.

Catholic Organizations
*
q
A.
Catholic Action (Accion Catoliea Mexicans)
1. Mexican Catholic Femine Union
a) urban workers, teachers, and campesinos
b) total membership of 198,052
2. Union of Mexican Catholics
a) total membership of 44,000
3. Catholic Action of Mexican Youth
a) total membership 18,000
4. Mexican Catholic Feminine Youth
a) women.*s organization between ages of
fifteen and thirty-five
b) total membership 88,221 3
■

.

*

. - T i

'

r

•

. .-s . t ..

'

^Dotson, 0£. cit., pp. 380-381.
O
Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party
Democracy,", p. 291.

3

Ibid., p. 292.

-117B. National Union of Heads of Families (Uni<ffn
Nacional de Padres de Familia )
a) total membership of 500,000
C» Knights of Columbus (Caballeros de Colon)
a) total membership 3,500
.
D. Federation of Catholic Schools (Federacion
de Coleaios Particulares)
a) Federal District colleges and schools
b) total number 112 .
E. Legion of Decency (Legion Mexicana de la
Decencia)
a]twenty-five members in each of the nation's
thirty-two federative entities
F. National Association of Catholic Newspapers,
Writers, Publishers, and Editors (ANPELEC)
a) total membership of 425
G. National Work of the Good Press (Obra Nacional
de la Buena Prensa)f
These figures suggest why the more than 4.5 million
Catholics, organized into expressive interest groups, cannot
be a force ignored by the PRI.

Seventy-five per cent of the

population is continually receiving Catholic literature.
The Good Press published, in 1953, an outstanding amount:
36,971,594 Catholic literature reviews; 208,030,509 infor
mation bulletins; 5,990,539 books and pamphlets; and
13,248,093 other publications.

In addition, The Good Press

publishes regularly two books, eight information bulletins,
and thirteen reviews each month.^
It is significant to note that the Church has used its
organization and its press to fight leftist movements and
communism.

In the early 1960’s the Uni/n Nacional de Padres

de Familia and the Accion Cat/lica Mexicana instigated
1Ibid.. pp. 292-293.
2Ibid.

-118demonstrations against communism.

In early 1961, mass demon

strations flared against -Castro and approximately 12,000 people
appeared before the Basilica to pary for Cuba.^-

The Church’s

hierarchy issued the July Declaration of Catholic Principles:
this document warned against Communist Party membership, pos
session of communist literature or approval of communist
action, and threatened excommunication to those who violated
the Declaration.2
Catholic organizations have also challenged the gov
ernment's federal education system.

On February 2, 1962,

150,000 persons, sponsored by the Unicfn Nacional de Padres
de Familia

and other anti-communist groups,paraded in

protest to the government’s primary school compulsory text
book program.

The protestors claimed that the government

was trying to indoctrinate students with the idea of state
supremacy and separate the child from his family.^

Another

rightist group, the Partido de Accidn Nacional (PAN) sup
ported the Church on the text book issue.

The PAN has often

seemed to be the Church’s political appendage.

PAN

sup

porters are strong Catholics and have selected such a man as
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Repot.t. XIV, No. 6
(August, 1961), 481.
^Graham, ©p.. cit.. p. 108.
3

"Mexico," Hispanic American Report XV. No. 2
(April, 1962), 112.
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sociation ,

president of the Catholic lawyers

as

for their presidential candidate in the 1964

campaign.
The PAN may be profiting from the extended tendency of
Mexicans to

regard it as the main opposition party.

seems to be

the focal point for what opposition there is to

the

P R I.

2

The PAN

The PAN has benefited from the change in electoral

rules; it now holds twenty seats in the Chamber,

Many ob

servers maintain that this representation in Congress may
permit and lead to debating and discussion of bills and
resolutions'.

Thus, this participation and strengthening of

representation by opposition parties may be a factor that can
lead to the eventual disintegration of the one party system.
Another rightist element which remains outside the party
is business.

The business and industrial groups, as mentioned

previously, deal with government through the c/maras
izations.

organ

It is common, however, for businessmen to support

other parties such as PAN.

It is known that business groups

often finance the publication of books, articles and pam
phlets against specific government policies.^
Although the government receives the general support
of the newer and more progressive business groups, the older
1Ibld.
2
Needier, “Changing the Guard in Mexico,", pp. 27-30.
q
^Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party
Democracy,", p. 300.
-

-120conservative business groups look askance at the government’s
active role in the promotion of industrialization.

The

conservatives feel that the government is exceeding its
boundaries by interfering in private enterprise and view with
fear the public sector Is- eacx>
o'5tcihment uupoin the,pf.iv.ate osector.
Government control of business has increased through
legislation, decrees, licenses, and import control.

In 1961,

Mexico's economy experienced a state of stagnation.

Private

investors became reluctant to invest and a flight of capital,
freezing of investments, decline in production, and accumu
lation of stock occurred as a result.

The government inter

vened to the extent that in 1962 for the first time public
investment equalled that of private investment.

Although this

government intervention seemed necessary, the government's
economic policy was subjected to a great amount of criticism.-^PHI and Mexican Economics
In 1962, at the annual meeting of the Associaci^n de
Banqueros de Mexico, Heriberto Vidales, the president of
the businessmen’s Confederaci^n de clmaras de Comercio,
said that the best way to attract private investment was to
provide a propitious climate for capital.

At this same

meeting, Harold Linder, president of the Export-Import
Bank, held that in spite of the government investments being

■^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 4
(June, 1962), 305.

-121desirable it could inhibit the flow of private capital.
Raymond Vernon viewed the stagnation of Mexican economy
in the early sixties with concern and suggested that the un
certainty of a multiparty system may be preferable “to the
paralysis of single party in search of u n a n i m i t y . jt was
felt that the past and present presidents of Mexico, by
trying to sustain the appearance of unanimity, and by taking
a middle of the road stand, had become fearful of taking a
position that would offend either side, and consequently they
had eased themselves into a political strait jacket.

Vernon

held that if the president were to take Mexican economics out
of its present slump, he must become stronger and take steps
that could lead to controversy.

Vernon proposed the following

solutions to the economic dilemma;

(l) more public investment,

(2) a revision of the domestic tax structure,

(3) more pri

vate investment, and (4) more foreign investment.^

(it can

be noted that the Mexican government eventually used these
measures.)
Although the Mexican economy came out of this stagnation
period, problems still exist in the economic sector.

Before

businessmen can be persuaded to invest in the manufacturing
of domestic products, a better domestic market has to
1Ibid.
2
Vernon,

ojd.

c i t ♦ , p.

3Ibid.. pp. 184-186.

191.
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At present two-thirds of the urban poor, the

e.iidal farmers and the small land owners must be considered
as outside the market for modern products.^
Price disparity and unequal distribution of income were
considered reasons for economic stagnation and also were
factors which resulted in the weak domestic market.

In the

last seven years, there has been a steady gain of the wealthy
at the expense of the poor.

In 1957, 4.9 per cent of the

Mexican families received 36.6 per cent of the national
income and by 1963, 4.8 per cent received 39.8 per cent of
the income.

In a meeting of the Convenci^n Nacional de

Centros Patronales. the Undersecretary of Industry and
Commerce, Hugo B. Margain, asked the delegates to overcome
the anemia of the internal market.

He urged that employers

strengthen the purchasing power of their workers by paying
them better wages and developing a profit-sharing program.2
By the end of 1964, both of these measures had been taken,
yet a notable disparity remained in the distribution of
incomes and the consequential weakness of the internal market
continued#
PRI and Instability
Although the PRI’s goal is to present a harmonious
front, it can be observed that discordant factors continue
1Ibid.
2

'’Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XVII, No. 5
(July, 1964), 399.

-123to persist'and to challenge7the:>one“party supremacy.
It has been suggested that

the PRI political machine

is hindered by decentralization

resulting from an attempt

to pacify the demands of & pluralistic society.

Criticism

has been aimed at the political machine for its failure to
represent the people, for too often government officials,
seeking personal gain, have been involved in graft and
corruption, and have placed their own interests over that
of the people and the nation.
The interest of the nation is supposedly coterminous
with the goals of the Revolution, but many feel that the
goals of the Revolution are merely changed and adjusted to
meet the pragmatic requirements

of the party.

out that the Revolution’s Constitution of 1917
nominally but not in actuality.

It is pointed
is adhered to

Its stipulation for division

of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches has gone unheeded, and charges have been made that
effective suffrage has not been granted.

Some feel that the

vagueness of revolutionary goals and ideology has resulted in
the PRI’s trying to rule over splinter groups of diverse
interests.

The argument is extended from this that the party

will not be able to maintain its monopolistic control in a
modernizing and pluralistic society, for new and conflicting
interests will continue to arise and will proliferate to the
extent that no one source can satisfy and control them.

-124It is perceived by some that the disintegration of the
party will come from within its own ranks by the breaking
away of the sectors or by factionalism within the sectors.
Even though minor disruptions are seen within the labor and
popular sectors, no current danger from their rebellion seems
apparent.

But the turmoil, strife and struggle that is

presently observable within the Farm Sector represents a
formidable threat to party stability.
Outside the party, the greatest sources of agitation
can be found in the rightist groups.

The Catholic Church,

nominally claimed to be the church of 97 per cent of the
Mexican people, controls through its active organizations
and press coverage a sizeable segment of society which it
can mobilize to support its measures.

The PAN, a rightist

and pro-clerical party, has come to be considered as the
major opposition party in Mexican politics.

Since the elec

toral reform laws of 1964, it has acquired twenty seats in
the Chamber of Deputies; this new access to representation
in the legislative arena may lead to more active debate that
could eventually culminate in organized and active opposition
within the Congress to PRI policy.

Economic stagnation in

Mexico in the early sixties appeared as a failure of the party
to adjust economic policy between the public and private
investment.

Even though this problem has been rectified at

present, continued success depends on the precarious

-125balancing of business and government.

The problem of unequal

income distribution and a weak internal market also remains a
major hurdle to Mexican economic stability..
Thus, it seems, that although the PRI reigns as a
dominant one-party system, elements of dissatisfaction and
potential challengers do exist and pose a threat to the
continuance and stability of the Mexican one-party system.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Mexico has progressively become a democratic country
and is

noted for its political stability among Latin

American countries.

Since 1928 the Partido Revolucionario

Institucional (PRI) has been the Mexican nation's guide
along the road of advancement and modernization.

The PRI

provides the Mexican people with an institutionalized sys
tem through which they can channel their interests and seek
their goals, for it acts as a means of mediation and com
munication between the people and government.

The party

has sought to substitute peaceful transference of power
through elections, persuasion, and compromise, for rebel
lions, military uprisings and physical coercion which have
so often typified the Latin American political arenas.

The

PRI, in seeking to represent the goals of the Revolution and
the Mexican nation, has tried to incorporate the major inter
ests of farm, labor, and the middle class, and in addition
has also acted as a conciliator and a guide for those inter
est

groups which have chosen to remain outside of its ranks.

-126-

-127The PRI has managed for thirty-six years to be the dominant
non-dictatorial party which has been flexible enough to
obtain the over-whelming support from the Mexican popu,lace
and remained relatively unchallenged to continue its one
party rule.

It is the contention of this chapter that,
i
'
judging from the party's past and present stability, the

PRI will continue its monopoly of the Mexican political
system.

In this concluding chapter, a final analysis of

the party will be made which will support this view.
The PRI, as a formally organized political agency,
provides a systematized mechanism through which functional
groupings may adjust their conflicts and seek their goals.
The strength and lasting influence of the
revolutionary party results in no small measure from
the high degree (for Mexico) of cohesion it has been
able to achieve through the interrelated devices of
this effective sector-party machinery and the activities
of a party leader-president who can manipulate the party
organization, the formal agencies of government, and the
bureaucracies of both.
Whether they be inside or:, outside the party's ranks,
the PRI has been most successful in representing and stabi
lizing Mexican interests.

In its quest for unanimity, the

party has walked a tightrope, taking care not to lean too
far to the left nor too far to the right, and by this method
of eclecticism, it has managed to represent both the progres
sive

and conservative elements of society.

^Scott,

cjd.

cit..

p.

175.

-128The question may be raised as to whether the PRI can continue,
in a modernizing, industrial, pluralistic society, to
resent the ever-increasing diverse interests.

rep

Deutscher and

Key in their general theory,that can be applied to one-party
systems, think not, for they contend that urbanization and
industrialization are elements resulting in the disinte
gration of the one-party system.

Both note that expansion

of politically cognizant labor groups can result in faction
alism which will lead to the termination of the one-party
system.

Many Latin American authorities recognized the pos

sibility of the Deutscher-Key theory being applicable to the
one-party system of Mexico.
In contrast to this school of thought are such men as
Betrand Raul and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Although their theory

concerns the one-party states of Nazi Germany and Soviet
Russia, it does have relevance in this study of the Mexican
one-party system.

Raul and Brzezinski contend that a modern

technological and industrial society makes it possible for
the one-party state to become more institutionalized, thus
insuring the continuance of a more pervading and compact
party system.

Thus it is felt by some authorities that the

PRI gains strength as Mexico undergoes the process of modern
ization for the PRI exists as the sole political agency whicl'i
offers a permanent, institutionalized mechanism.

Scott,-

-129supports this view in the following quotation.
To put it another way, as iheir number and
diversity grow, Mexico's proliferating functional
interests feel a growing dependency upon those party
mechanisms for adjusting their conflicts.
It is
neither the PRI itself nor any individual president,
so much as the need for adjustment among the competing
interests which both serve, that motivates interest
associations to act within the official party or to
accept its part in the decision-making process if they
do not happen to belong to one of the three sectors.1
It is significant that the PRI, being aware of the
expanding interests in society, has sought to envelop them
within its sectors particularly through inclusion in the
Popular Sector, essentially the sector of the middle class.
The importance of the middle class must not go unnoticed;
in Mexico it is the middle class which is now guiding the
government arid the Revolution.

As Mexican society increas

ingly experiences the process of transition of modernization,
more of its citizens are joining the ranks of the middle
class.

This middle class is seen by Scott, Needier, and

Johnson as a factor which tends toward moderation and acts
as a steadying influence in Mexican politics; the middle
class, by its nature, tends towards conservatism and has sup
ported the PRI middle-of-the-road position.
The Popular Sector, owing a great deal to its primarily
middle class membership, has evolved into the strongest and
the most politically active of the PRI's three sectors.

_

_____
Scott, o]D. cit.. p. 175.

",

,.

It

-130is this sector which has exceeded the other two in congres
sional representation, and because of the Popular Sector's
containing the FSTSE, the government bureaucrat's union, it
has been the beneficiary of government favor.

It thus seems

that the Popular Sector, receiving governmental benefits, by
its influence and numerical strength

will continue to gain

in power and in numbers and will most likely remain in the
ranks of the official party.
The Labor Sector appears to be a secure and steady force
within the party structure.

No major strikes have occurred

since the 1958-1959 series grid Lopez Hateos, noted for his
ability to deal with labor, was able to gain labor's support
during his administration.
The government extended benefits of social security,
old age insurance,and unemployment compensation to labor.
Recently, in an attempt to make a more even distribution of
income arid to strengthen the laborers' purchasing powers,
Congress passed a law that introduced a new sharing plan
which would permit workers to share in company profits.
Organized labor lauded the government for its action and
regarded this plan as the fulfillment of a long awaited dream.
Although problems have risen within the Labor Sector
when its leaders have failed to represent it, measures have
been taken to prevent such a reoccurrence.

The CTM; and'its

BUO groups continue to stabilize and head the Labor Sector of

-131the PRI,

From all signs, it seems as if Labor will continue

to seek its objectives and solve its differences within the
ranks of the PRI.
At present the greatest threat to the PRI’s stability
comes from the Farm Sector which is experiencing instability
and strife.

Overpopulation, unemployment, poverty, graft

and corruption plague the Farm Sector and cause the rural
region to rise in protest with hunger marches and paracar- .
distas1 demonstrations.

The Lopez and the Qrdaz adminis

trations, aware of the agrarian plight, have begun to
emphasize

agrarian reform.

The government has sought to aid the Farm Sector by
establishing public works projects for irrigation and
electrification, by educating the rural people to modern
means of farm technology, by providing for a distribution of
land on a more rational base, by opening unexploited areas
to colonization, by seeking to rectify the unemployment
problem by the introduction of light industry, by extension
of credit to the e.iidos . and by eradicating corruption in
its agrarian institutions.

Thus, it can be seen that the

government is not being idle but is constructively trying
to resolve the dilemma of the Farm Sector.
Nevertheless, extreme poverty persists, and peasants
often unable to see the value of the long range projects
of the government, continue to remain dissatisfied.

It is

-132probable that at preseat this sector, or at least a
major part of it, could break from the ranks of the
official party.

Yet if this sector did break away from

the PRI, there is little fear of it forming an opposition
party which could successfully challenge the PRI, for the
Farm Sector, since its origin, has been the least articu
late of the three sector organizations.

And the rural area,

although being continually exposed to modern techniques,
still remains relatively isolated from the major impacts
of modernization.

Except for spontaneous eruptions, polit

ical apathy and unawareness prevail among its members.
Consequently, it appears that although the Farm Sector
is unstable and offers the greatest threat to the PRI, its
threat |s. notegrav’
e enough to disrupt
of the PRI.

the basic stability

It seems as if the party machine has been suc

cessful in securing the support of the labor and popular
sectors.

Therefore, for the present and in the foreseeable

future, the PRI most likely will be able to escape any
serious internal disintegration within its sectors.
The party machine has stabilized its internal structure
by allowing democracy to function within its ranks.

To date

neither the Congress

nor elections have provided an arena

for political action.

It is significant that the PRI has

established a stage for such action within its own ranks.
Here, through the interaction of sector representatives,

-133party committees, and government officials, intra-party
elections are held and decided, decisions are formulated,
and compromises are made.
The PRI is becoming more democratic in its general
make up, for it has sought to reach out and allow increasing
participation from the grass-roots elements.

The people

have more voice in their choice of representatives, and local
and state political bosses are becoming a part of the past.
Disputes are generally settled by administration and lawenforcement, and such incidents as the Jaramillo murder arid
the burning of El Huanal village are isolated from the
general practice of Mexican law enforcement.
The Zapata Movement of 1962 protested that the Mexican
people were being deprived of effective suffrage and it is
generally admitted that the real power struggle exists in
intra-party elections, not in the official Mexican elections.
However, elections have begun to become more democratic.
Opposition party candidates are allowed to campaign openly
throughout Mexico.

Elections have become more peaceful until

in 1964 there was not a major uprising or demonstration; for
the first time, the opposition candidate formally conceded
the election.

An effort was made in 1964 to reform the

election laws to enable minority parties to have more op
portunity for representation in Congress.
Because more popular participation is urged and
increasing interests have arisen, it has been necessary

-134for responsibility, in decision making, to be allocated
among officials at the various levels of government.

This

has not been a reversion toward the system of political
bosses, for strong, central control continues to emanate
from the president.

No official figure can remain in his

position if he is opposed to the president’s policy, a'nd
the president still has the power to make or break leaders
of the interest groups.
That there is considerable overlapping in government,
party, and sector personnel has been noted.

Imputations

have been made that often this polyfunctionalism causes
government officials to seek personal gain at the expense
of their sector’s interests.

At times this has been true,

but recently pressure upon sector officials, such as the
strikes of 1958, and the newly passed labor resolution on
labor officials which forbids them to hold a political
position at the same time they are representing labor, seek
to eradicate the corrupt system of old.

It is important

that, since the termination of the Aleman administration,
Mexico has taken major strides in preventing graft and
corruption in its politics.
Polyfunctionalism can, if it is used rightly, be
advantageous.

By choosing sector members to serve-’as party

and government officials, men are chosen who are informed and
are qualified to deal with the sectors’ problems.

The over

lapping and interaction have also afforded all sides a more

-135direct means of communication than they would ordinarily
have if there were no such integration.
The party’s becoming identified with the government
has helped to make it more stable in the minds of the
people.

The PRI has become the official political party

of the government.

And through the government the PRI has

been able to control the executive, legislative, judicial
and administrative branches of the nation for nearly forty
years.
During this period the PRI has also identified itself
with the Revolution.

The Almond-Verba study concluded that

the Revolution continues to have an important psychological
effect upon the people.

They found that pride in the Mexican

nation was dependent to a considerable extent on the PRI's
continuing symbolic identification with the Revolution.

Of

the Mexicans interviewed in this study,65 per cent could
name general goals of the Revolution.

These goals, being

broad and general, have remained as a national unifying
force arid have been the basis of the party’s platform.
The party has been accused of amending the revolutionary
goals to the extent that it has substituted its own pragmatic
measure for the original value of the Revolution.

It is to

be pointed out that the revolutionary goals, from the begin
ning, were ambiguous.

From its inception, the party..has in

terpreted the goals to comply with the times.

It has, by

this flexibility and adaptability, kept the revolutionary

-136goals alive to act as

a restraiht against excesses of

private investment, and to stimulate social, economic, and
political justice among the Mexican citizenry.
Charges have been levied against the PRI that it has
abandoned the ideals of the Revolution since many have felt
that party arid government officials have become too occuppied
with graft and personal gain to carry out the ideal of the
Revolution.

Even though corruption exists today (notable in

the government agrarian institutions),the Mexican govern
ment, probably more than any other Latin American government,
is rising above the tradition of mordida.

Public officials

such as Diaz Ordaz recognize corruption within the government
and have taken measures to eradicate it.
The PRI’s success in its quest for unanimity extends to
circles outside the official party.

For the party is gen

erally able to convince outside interests that since the PRI
has the undisputable majority, a minority interest can most
easily achieve its goal through the PRI.

An example of the

convincing manner of the PRI could be noted in the 1964 pres
idential election when two of the three legally recognized
opposition parties,

( the PPS and the PARM) supported and

voted for the PRI presidential candidate.
Other opposition parties such as the extra-legal
/
rightist parties, the Frente Patriota de Mexico, the Union

Sinarquista, the Partido Democr/tico Cristiano. and the
Movimiento Social Democr^tica and the extra-legal leftist

''

-137parties, the Frente Electoral del Puebla. the Central
Campesina and the Partido Comunista Mexicana offered nothing
but weak and confused challenges.
The Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) helped to maintain
its growing reputation as the main opposition party by being
the only legally recognized party to run a presidential
candidate in 1964.

The PAN experienced a gain in its repre

sentation in Congress by acquiring 20 seats in the Chamber;
this , many feel, could cause Congress to regain its consti
tutional position as a major branch of the Mexican government.
If active debate took place in Congress, a new political
arena would exist to which the interests of Mexico could take
their requests and problems for settlement.

At the moment,

however, many hold that this is not likely to happen, for the
PAN itself regards this new representation more as a honorary
recognition rather than a means by which it could participate
in active debate on the floor of the Congress.-*-

Since the

PRI continues to hold such a staggering majority in Congress,
it can be assumed that even with the new method of represen
tation, it would be unlikely for the Congress to emerge as a
governmental branch which engages in meaningful deliberation,
for it appears as if legislation will continue to be decided
upon before its presentation to Congress.

If opposition

’'"The writer has seen no reference to increased
participation or engagement of opposition parties in
Congressional debate since the new representation policy
has been in effect.

parties did voice their complaints, the only utility in
their -doing so would be that at least the Congress could
be .used as a sounding board for the opposition.
The PAM has suffered from the PRI’s swing toward the
right, and the selection of the conservative D^az Qrdaz
served as a blow to many areas of PAN support,

Qrdaz’s

moderate, conservative and anti-communist position cut
into the PAN vote and caused many conservatives to bolt for
the first time from PAN ranks:to.vote for a PRI candidate.
This recent rightist orientation of the PRI has pla
cated the major rightist institutional organization, the
Catholic Church.

Although the Church , with its large

membership, Catholic organizations, and press coverage,
could muster enough strength to challenge PRI stability,
it seems unlikely.

For the present, the Church and govern

ment seem to have agreed on a peaceful co-existence.

The

government has attempted to gain Church support by a loose
interpretation of the Constitution's anti-clerical pro'-'.
visions.

s:

The government has also become much more rightist

and has joined the Church in its fight against communism.
The Church, too, has acquiesced by becoming more liberal.
The Papal Encyclical, Mater et Magistra. advocating social,
economic and political justice for the laboring class, has
become the twentieth century Bible of the Church in Mexico.
Another major rightist institution is the military.
Most authorities concur, however, that the military presents

-139no threat to the Mexican government, and as a unit it is out
of Mexican politics.

It is contended that the military

per

sonnel, generally of middle-class background, tend to sympa
thize with the PRI.

Further, it is noted that often military

personnel become affiliated in the sectors, most often within
the Popular Sector.

Business and industrial groups have

existed outside the PRI’s organization.

But through the

special chambers, the CONCAMIN and the COjMCANCO, the PRI
has been able to institutionalize the interrelations of gov
ernment and business.

These Ccfmaras are under the juris

diction of the Ministry of Economy, and represent the major
business interests of Mexico.

In addition, private trade

and commercial groups exist and seek their interests through
the Presidential Office.
There is a division in the business community between
the old group and the

new group and disagreement is voiced

by the two groups in relation to the amount of government
investment that should be allowed.

Although the two groups

may differ on the degree of government investment, they both
concur that government investment and protection is needed
and wanted.

Brandenburg’s conclusion seems correct when

he states that ’’Mexican business prefers a stable nation and
accordingly at least passively supports the PRI and actively
supports the government."^
1
Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party
Democracy,", p. 300.
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Government and business do not compete but cooperate.

It

is the duty of the Mexican government to set the economic stage
and business must then supplement it.

Through National

Financiers, the government has invested capital in virgin
fields and has sought to concentrate investment where lack of
capital has existed.

The government has also joined the mixed

companies by investing along with private Mexican and foreign
capital.

The government has aided Mexico’s private industries

with its policies on tariffs, fixation of import controls,labor
legislation, exemption from taxes and its extension of credit
and subsidies.
Between the years of 1939 and 1950, an unprecedented
growth was noted in the Mexican economy.

Except for a brief

stagnation period in the early 1960’s, the Mexican economy has
been increasing substantially.

Particularly significant was

the fact that in 1964 the Mexican economy did not experience
the usual and expected economic fall which occurs during pres
idential election years,

Rather, investment from private

investors, domestic and foreign, increased.

The cloak of

confidence seemed to cover the Mexican economic scene in 1964.
This confidence extended into 1965 with the government in
creasing the Federal budget 11.9 per cent over its 1964 budget.
Yet it is to be noted that shortcomings are still evident in
the uneven distribution of national income.

However, it is

held that such measures as revision of the tax structure and
wage sharing laws will eventually help to solve this disparity

-141in distribution.
Thus, one could say that although problems are present in
Mexican economics there is a general feeling of confidence and
a belief that future prospects for investment and production <::
are promising.
In conclusion, it appears as if the PRI will remain the
dominant force in Mexican politics.

The ‘elements of stability

have set a concrete base for the continuance of the PRI and
have prevented the rise of any opposition capable of success
fully

challenging the one party system.
One of the most significant elements of stabilization

has been the party's own political machine.

Through this

machine, the PRI has provided an institutionalized mechanism
through which the proliferating, functional interests of Mexico
could channel their interests and seek their political, social
and economic goals.

In addition, this machine has provided the

only arena where popular participation and political action
could be found; for it is within the ranks of the party that
the actual contests for power occur.
Equally important as the physical, mechanical structure
of party organization has been ihefmentdl'image of ..the..PRI
which has been instilled in the Mexican mind.

The PRI has

succeeded in identifying itself with the government, the
Revolution, and consequently with the goals of the Mexican
nation.

The PRI has claimed to represent all major interests

of Mexico.

The party, in its quest for unanimity, has been

-142able to convince both major outside interest groups and
opposition parties, as well as the sectors in its ranks,
that they can best achieve their objectives by working with
the government and party officials.

Although it occasionally

has placated extreme elements by its shifting to the far left
and far right, the PEI has endeavored to balance the interests
and maintain a moderate, middle of the road position.

By its

success in the balancing of such interests, the PRI has been
allowed to govern as the unchallenged, dominating force of
Mexican politics, and has been able to mold the Mexican nation
into a socially, politically, and economically progressive
country.

It appears that at present and in the forseeable

future, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional will be given
the mandate for continued leadership of Mexico.
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